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THE COPY PROCESS
JOSEPH P. FISHMAN*
There’s more than one way to copy. The process of copying can be laborious
or easy, expensive or cheap, educative or unenriching. But the two intellectual
property regimes that make copying an element of liability, copyright and trade
secrecy, approach these distinctions differently. Copyright conflates them. Infringe-
ment doctrine considers all copying processes equally suspect, asking only whether
the resulting product is substantially similar to the protected work. By contrast,
trade secrecy asks not only whether but also how the defendant copied. It limits
liability to those who appropriate information through means that the law deems
improper.
This Article argues that copyright doctrine should borrow a page from trade
secrecy by factoring the defendant’s copying process into the infringement analysis.
To a wide range of actors within the copyright ecosystem, differences in process
matter. Innovators face less risk from competitors if imitation is costly than if it is
cheap. Consumers may value a work remade from scratch more than they do a
digital reproduction. Beginners can learn more technical skills from deliberately
tracing an expert’s creative steps than from simply clicking cut and paste. The con-
sequences of copying, in short, often depend on how the copies are made.
Fortunately, getting courts to consider process in copyright cases may not be as
far-fetched as the doctrine suggests. Black-letter law notwithstanding, courts some-
times subtly invoke the defendant’s process when ostensibly assessing the propriety
of the defendant’s product. While these decisions are on the right track, it’s time to
bring process out into the open. Copyright doctrine could be both more descrip-
tively transparent and more normatively attractive by expressly looking beyond the
face of a copy and asking how it got there.
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INTRODUCTION
One of intellectual property (“IP”) law’s core challenges is distin-
guishing productive acts of copying from counterproductive ones. In
both copyright and trade secret law, copying from the owner is neces-
sary for liability but not sufficient.1 Because not all copying is action-
able, these regimes must decide which to penalize and which to
permit.2 The inquiry largely involves a comparison between products.
One can’t assess infringement without holding up a protected good
next to an accused copy and asking whether they appear too alike.3
But appearances don’t always tell the whole story. Similar prod-
ucts—even ones that are copied from the same original source—can
have dissimilar provenances. Some reproductions are made with skill
and labor, while others are made easily and cheaply. Some reproduc-
tions are made in ways that teach their makers new know-how, while
others are made in ways that yield nothing more than the reproduc-
tion itself. Within most areas of human creativity, there’s more than
one way to copy.
To a wide range of actors within the IP ecosystem, the means of
copying matters. Innovators face less risk from competitors if imita-
tion is costly than if it is cheap. Consumers may value a work remade
from scratch more than they do an otherwise identical digital repro-
duction. Beginners can learn more technical skills from deliberately
tracing an expert’s creative steps than from simply clicking cut and
paste (ask anyone who’s taken a painting class or built a homemade
Rob Merges, Will Ortman, Betsy Rosenblatt, Guy Rub, Matthew Sag, Pam Samuelson,
Sean Seymore, Lea Shaver, Chris Sprigman, Kevin Stack, Cara Suvall, Rebecca Tushnet,
and Melissa Wasserman, along with participants at the 15th Annual Intellectual Property
Scholars Conference, the Illinois IP Colloquium, and the University of Pennsylvania Law
School’s Copyright Scholarship Roundtable. I am indebted to Chen-Chen Jiang and Sarah
O’Loughlin for excellent research assistance. Any errors are products of no one’s processes
but my own.
1 Patents, by contrast, are enforceable even against one who independently develops
an identical invention. Copying is irrelevant to liability. See infra Section I.B.
2 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (“[N]ot
all copying . . . is copyright infringement.”); Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318
F.3d 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[I]f the defendant independently created the allegedly
misappropriated item with only ‘slight’ contribution from the plaintiff’s trade secret, then
the defendant is not liable for misappropriation.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995)); cf. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (“[C]opying is not always discouraged or disfavored
by the laws which preserve our competitive economy. . . . Allowing competitors to copy
will have salutary effects in many instances.”).
3 See Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property
Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2014) (“A principal question in IP
infringement disputes is whether the defendant’s product (or work, or brand, or idea) is
too similar in some respect to the plaintiff’s.”).
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radio). The consequences of copying, in short, often depend on how
the copies are made.
That’s a significant contingency for IP policy, which most com-
mentators in the United States justify in terms of the consequences
that it generates.4 Copyrights and trade secrets alike are supposed to
generate enough social value to outweigh their costs.5 If some copy
processes are more valuable or less costly than others, one might
expect the law to scrutinize not only what gets copied but also the
means through which that copying is done.
Trade secrecy, however, is the only IP regime that explicitly does
so. Secret information isn’t protected against all methods of copying,
just against the ones that the law deems to be “improper.”6 That ele-
ment requires courts to assess “whether the means of acquisition are
inconsistent with accepted principles of public policy.”7 Under that
test, using reverse engineering to decipher and then exploit the infor-
mation is fully permissible.8 Indeed, courts encourage reverse engi-
4 There are so many sources on this point that a single footnote can only skim the
surface. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann & Mark P. McKenna, Intergenerational Progress, 2011
WIS. L. REV. 123, 123 (2011) (“The Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution
identifies ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ as the ends served by exclusive rights to
writings and discoveries. Courts and scholars alike overwhelmingly have conceived of these
ends in utilitarian terms, seeking more and better inventions and works of authorship.”);
Lawrence B. Solum, Questioning Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 834 (2010)
(noting that under “the mainstream of American theory . . . [r]egimes for the management
of information resources are assessed by reference to the consequences they produce, and
the key question is whether a given regime is welfare- or utility-maximizing”). To be sure,
several IP scholars have recently questioned whether consequentialism can perform all the
work asked of it, see, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3
(2011) (“The sheer practical difficulty of measuring or approximating all the variables
involved means that the utilitarian program will always be at best aspirational.”), and
argued that deontic theories can perform a greater share of the normative heavy lifting,
see, e.g., id. (invoking Locke, Rawls, and Kant to justify IP scope); Frischmann &
McKenna, supra, at 123 (asserting that “the normative basis for IP laws need not be
utilitarianism” and that “there is room for a normative commitment to intergenerational
justice”). Still, despite this developing pluralism, in the interests of space I limit myself in
this Article to the familiar consequentialist lens.
5 See Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401, 1408
(2014) (“[Trade secrecy] is increasingly theorized as a subset of intellectual property
because it shares the incentive-promoting goals of patent and copyright. Courts and
scholars often justify patent, copyright, and trade secret laws as mechanisms to encourage
the invention or creation of new technological advances and expressive works.”).
6 See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf; E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1995); RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF TORTS § 759 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. c.
8 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (observing that trade
secret law “does not offer protection against discovery by . . . so-called reverse engineering,
858 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:855
neering expressly because of the positive externalities that the process
can generate.9 Although one may not derive, say, the undisclosed
formula for Coca-Cola through industrial espionage, deriving it
through experimentation in a food lab would be fair game.
By contrast, copyright doctrine treats all copy processes as
equally suspect. It doesn’t matter how laborious, how skillful, how
expensive, or how edifying the defendant’s method is. So long as the
end product looks substantially similar to the original, the means of
copying are irrelevant.10 Consider, for example, the 200 photogra-
phers who descended on Yosemite National Park on September 15,
2005, hoping to recreate Ansel Adams’s iconic photograph, Autumn
Moon.11 Astronomers had previously determined the exact location,
date, and time at which Adams had taken the photograph fifty-seven
years earlier.12 For a four-minute interval that comes around only
once every nineteen years, the moon returned to the same sky loca-
tion in the same phase, enabling skilled photographers to replicate
Adams’s shot.13 Does that backstory distinguish the recreated photo-
graphs from a quick digital duplicate? No, at least according to black-
letter copyright doctrine. Any of these new photographs sufficiently
similar to Adams’s original would be problematic. The same goes for
that is by starting with the known product and working backward to divine the process
which aided in its development or manufacture”); Chi. Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400
(9th Cir. 1982) (holding that publishing key codes for locks did not constitute trade secret
misappropriation because the codes had been acquired through reverse engineering).
9 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989)
(praising reverse engineering as “an essential part of innovation” that “often leads to
significant advances in technology”); Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174,
178 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that reverse engineering is a proper means of deducing
another’s trade secret because it “involves the use of technical skills that we want to
encourage”).
10 See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1237 (3d Cir.
1986) (“[T]he fact that it will take a great deal of effort to copy a copyrighted work does
not mean that the copier is not a copyright infringer. The issue . . . is simply whether the
copyright holder’s expression has been copied, not how difficult it was to do the copying.”);
Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 587, 599
(observing that by focusing on products, the Copyright Act may “protect[ ] a suite of
processes, as any process that reproduces that particular painting or soundtrack is
precluded by copyright, whether the process is painstakingly reproducing the Picasso
image by hand or whether the process is simply scanning and printing the image”). For
further discussion, see infra Section I.B.
11 See Roger W. Sinnott, An Ansel Adams Encore, SKY & TELESCOPE, Jan. 2005, at 93,
https://digital.library.txstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10877/4032/fulltext.pdf.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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repainting a portrait by hand,14 or even refilming an entire feature-
length motion picture shot for shot.15
The divergence between these two branches of law highlights a
system design choice that’s been hiding in plain sight. Whenever IP
policymakers seek to regulate copying, they can either focus only on
its ends or also on its means. But there hasn’t yet been much delibera-
tion about that choice. IP scholarship tends to emphasize which prod-
ucts are made more than how they are made.16 To the extent that this
scholarship has examined the defendant’s process, it has concentrated
on the question of whether copying should be an element of infringe-
ment to begin with. Copyright and trade secret law say yes, patent law
says no, and observers debate the difference.17 I don’t intend here to
make inroads into that already rich discussion. But there remains a
14 See infra notes 176–78 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 171–75 and accompanying text. I focus here on graphic and
audiovisual works because, as I explain in Part III, they’re the most likely to be affected by
my proposal. With literary works, a given copy process will rarely offer significantly greater
benefits than any other. But see infra note 309 and accompanying text. With dramatic
works, whose marketability depends on live performance, even laborious copy processes
will threaten the owner’s ability to recoup investments. And with sound recordings, the
existing compulsory license under 17 U.S.C. § 115 permits recreations already.
16 Welfarists’ emphasis on end products encompasses both sheer quantity of new
works, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J.
71, 75 (2014) (“Most utilitarians understand social welfare to be maximized—in the context
of copyright law—by the creation of ever more artistic works.”), and works of particular
social value, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright
Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 37 (2004) (advancing a product-differentiation theory of
copyright scope in which “[t]he importance of incentives to produce new works is less
significant when the number of existing works and the chance that a new work will be
largely redundant are greater”); Fromer, supra, at 84 (using information theory to identify
what kinds of works the copyright system should promote); Robert P. Merges, Essay, The
Concept of Property in the Digital Era, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1239, 1267 (2009) (defending
copyright’s tradeoff in which “[t]he cost of premium creative works . . . is a slight reduction
in the volume of amateur works”); cf. Sean M. O’Connor, The Central Role of Law as a
Meta Method in Creativity and Entrepreneurship , in CREATIVITY, LAW AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 87, 87 (Shubha Ghosh & Robin Paul Malloy eds., 2011) (lamenting IP
scholarship’s “unfortunate fixation on artifacts as the locus of human ingenuity,” which
overlooks the methods through which those artifacts are produced); Brett M. Frischmann,
Book Review, Cultural Environmentalism and The Wealth of Networks, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1083, 1096 (2007) (arguing that the legal community “place[s] too much emphasis on
easily observable and measurable outputs—works and inventions,” resulting in “an
impoverished understanding of the cultural environment”).
17 See, e.g., Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law, 98 GEO.
L.J. 1643 (2010); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV.
465, 528 (2004); Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention
Defence in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002); Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind
Words for Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1
(2016); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105
MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006).
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follow-up question left largely understudied.18 Once one decides that
copying does matter, as our copyright and trade secret regimes have,
there still remains a policy question as to whether the manner of
copying should matter along with it.
In this Article, I argue that it should. Copyright doctrine ought to
borrow a page from trade secrecy doctrine by factoring the defen-
dant’s copying process into the infringement analysis. The scope of
copyright protection has expanded as the cheapest available form of
copying has grown ever cheaper. But not every copyist wants the
cheapest method—some want to learn how to do it the hard way,
others seek to tap a market that prizes labor-intensive recreations, and
still others may prefer a difficult process for its expressive value. An
infringement doctrine that looks only to the cheapest common
denominator will unnecessarily sweep in copying that threatens no
market harm to the owner. Moreover, from the consumer’s perspec-
tive, a second comer’s recreation of a familiar work is by definition
something that the original creator cannot provide. Audiences cele-
brate the act of replication from professional appropriation art19 to
amateur videos on YouTube.20 In these contexts, handmade copying
can become its own act of performance in a way that quick, digital
copying cannot. It’s the audience’s loss if copyright law inhibits those
performances by grouping them together with mechanical duplica-
tions. Finally, as a number of commentators have already acknowl-
edged,21 learning-by-doing often requires replicating others’ successes.
Copying today can be great training for creating tomorrow. But this
educational spillover is more likely to emerge from hands-on involve-
18 An important exception is Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002). Samuelson and Scotchmer
focus on reverse engineering in technological fields like software and semiconductors. As I
argue here, some expressive fields not only implicate many of Samuelson and Scotchmer’s
economic insights, but even invite another set of process distinctions above and beyond the
ones they identify. See infra Part II.
19 See, e.g., Mike Bidlo, in 1 THE GROVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ART 266 (Joan
Marter ed., 2011) (noting Bidlo’s “series of remarkably accurate copies” of Jackson Pollock
and “exact replicas of art central to the modernist canon”); Nadine Rubin Nathan, Asked
& Answered: Mike Bidlo, T MAG. (July 2, 2010, 12:43 PM), http://tmagazine.blogs.
nytimes.com/2010/07/02/asked-answered-mike-bidlo/ (discussing Bidlo’s “dead ringers” for
Warhol’s famous Brillo boxes and other “exact replicas”).
20 See, e.g., Tiffany Lee, Beyonce´ Gives Props to 16-Year-Old’s Shot-by-Shot
“Countdown” Cover Video Starring—A Snuggie!, YAHOO! NEWS (July 24, 2012), https://
ca.news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-juice-celeb-news/beyonc%C3%A9-gives-props-16-old-shot-
shot-countdown-133452942.html (describing a sixteen-year-old boy’s “mind-bogglingly
accurate remake” of a Beyonce´ music video). As of this writing, the remake has attracted
over three million views. Ton Do-Nguyen, Countdown (Snuggie Version) [Comparison],
YOUTUBE (July 9, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W4aiwTkDwCY.
21 See infra Section II.C.
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ment than from an automated process that the user doesn’t under-
stand. Discriminating in favor of productive copy processes thus offers
a novel way to promote the development of creative skills without
significantly undermining the upstream creator’s incentives.
Copyright’s indifference to the defendant’s process likely persists
on the strength of the trope that core copyrightable works like art,
music, and film reveal their relevant know-how to the world as soon as
they’re published.22 If disclosure were instantaneous and automatic,
then distinctions between copy processes would indeed be trivial.23
But this account of copyrightable works is incomplete. To be sure,
artistic expression readily discloses the information necessary for
mechanical duplication. Obtaining a copy of the latest Hollywood
blockbuster or top-40 pop song is often just a few clicks away. Never-
theless, that expression often does not so readily disclose all the infor-
mation necessary for recreation from scratch. Recreating a
complicated expressive work can be as technically challenging as
recreating a complicated industrial device. Once duplications and full-
fledged recreations are disaggregated, many expressive works start to
look more like secrets.
Fortunately, getting courts to consider process in copyright cases
may not be as far-fetched as the doctrine suggests. Courts sometimes
subtly invoke the defendant’s process when ostensibly assessing the
propriety of the defendant’s product. While these decisions are on the
right track, it’s time to bring process out into the open. Copyright doc-
trine could be both more descriptively transparent and more norma-
tively attractive by expressly looking beyond the face of a copy and
asking how it got there.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins by describing
the different ways that black-letter copyright and trade secrecy doc-
22 See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore):
The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-up
Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1832 n.96 (2008) (commenting that within the copyright
paradigm, “the information the work embodies is clear on its face”); J.H. Reichman,
Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-how: Implications of Copyright Protection
for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 660 (1989) (citing the
“artistic work” as the archetype of an informational product that “tends to bear its know-
how on its face” and therefore is “exposed to instant predation when successful and is
likely to enjoy zero lead time after being launched on the market”); Samuelson &
Scotchmer, supra note 18, at 1585 (“The artistic and literary works [copyright] law
traditionally protected did not need to be reverse-engineered to be understood. . . . To
access this information, one can simply read or analyze the work.”).
23 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 370 (2003) (“[F]rom an economic standpoint there is little
distinction between really cheap reverse engineering on the one hand and piracy on the
other.”).
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trines approach the defendant’s copying process. In Part II, I offer a
framework for evaluating different processes’ welfare implications. I
make the case that copyrighted works are subject to many of the same
justifications for process sensitivity as trade secrets. In Part III, I argue
that courts could work that sensitivity into copyright adjudication
through the fair use doctrine without any legislative intervention and
likely at a manageable marginal evidentiary cost. I close by offering a
few rough recommendations for how courts might apply this factor in
fair use cases.
I
COPY PROCESS IN IP DOCTRINE
Should infringement liability focus solely on the defendant’s
product or also on her process? The question can be broken down into
two issues. Policymakers first need to decide whether to distinguish
between imitators and independent creators. A regime that focuses on
product alone wouldn’t care whether the defendant was a slavish
copyist or instead an innocent developer haplessly unaware that
someone else had already beaten him to the punch. This decision is
IP’s first question of process sensitivity.
If only the product counts, that’s the end of the matter. But if
liability requires copying, it invites a second question: whether all
copy processes should be weighted equally in the infringement anal-
ysis. Does infringement doctrine ask only whether the plaintiff’s work
was copied, or does it also ask how it was copied?
Each IP regime offers a different model, summarized below in
Table 1.24
24 The major IP subfield missing from my scheme is trademark law. I don’t focus on
trademarks in this Article because, unlike the other regimes that center on promoting
innovation and creativity, trademarks’ traditional purpose is reducing consumer confusion.
Given this aim, though, it should be unsurprising that trademark infringement does not
require copying. A confusing mark will remain confusing no matter how it is produced. As
the Second Circuit recently noted: “The trademark system . . . stands in sharp contrast to
the copyright system. Copyright, unlike trademark, rewards creativity and originality even
if they interfere with the rights of an existing copyright holder. In the copyright system
there is a defense to infringement known as ‘independent creation’ . . . . The trademark
system, unlike the copyright system, aims to prevent consumer confusion even at the
expense of a manufacturer’s creativity: in trademark, if a branding specialist produces a
mark that is identical to one already trademarked by another individual or corporation, he
must ‘go back to the drawing board.’” Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent
Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 224 n.20 (2d Cir. 2012); see also William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265,
269–70 (1987) (noting the free rider problems with which trademark law is concerned). But
see Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1525, 1525 n.1 (2007) (noting that, although independent creation is no defense to
trademark infringement, many courts still treat the defendant’s intent to trade on the
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Patent law focuses exclusively on product. Anyone who exploits a
patented invention without authorization, even one who’s never seen
the patented invention before, is an infringer.25 Whether one copied,
let alone how one copied, is irrelevant.26 At the other extreme lies
trade secrecy. To begin with, only copying counts.27 If I happen to
develop the same algorithm that you have taken pains to keep secret,
the law will not intervene. On top of that, only certain kinds of
copying count. Trade secret law distinguishes between the copyists
who use proper means and those who don’t. “It is the employment of
improper means to procure the trade secret, rather than mere copying
or use, which is the basis of liability.”28 Copyright doctrine occupies a
middle ground. Like a trade secret, a copyright guards only against
copying. Independent creation is a complete defense.29 But unlike a
trade secret, a copyright is not circumscribed by an “improper means”
element. Hornbook law dictates that one means of copying is as good
(or bad) as any other.30
goodwill of the protected mark as strong evidence that consumers would likely be confused
by the defendant’s mark).
25 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974) (“[Patent]
protection goes not only to copying the subject matter . . . but also to independent
creation.”); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“[C]opying . . . is of no import on the question of whether the claims of an issued patent
are infringed.”). For a good example of this strict liability in action, see JAMES BESSEN &
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 47 (2008) (describing a successful lawsuit against
the maker of the BlackBerry mobile device, which had independently invented a wireless
e-mail technology that was covered by the plaintiff’s existing patents).
26 A caveat here is that copying, though unnecessary for liability, does affect some
other doctrines, like willfulness. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying
in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1428–31 (2009).
27 See id. at 1466 (“Trade secret law punishes only misappropriation of one’s ideas by
another—that is, copying.”).
28 Chi. Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1939)); see also Robert G. Bone, A New
Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 250
(1998) (“Trade secret law does not impose liability for mere copying; others are free to
inspect a publicly available product or use reverse engineering to glean secret information
from it.”).
29 E.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The
Copyright Act forbids only copying; if independent creation results in an identical work,
the creator of that work is free to sell it.”); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191
F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (noting that a copyright owner “has no right to prevent another
from publishing a work identical with his, if not copied from his”).
30 See supra note 10 (collecting sources).
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Whether Copied How Copied
Patents No N/A
Copyrights Yes No
Trade Secrets Yes Yes
TABLE 1. RELEVANCE OF DEFENDANT’S PROCESS
This Part surveys the role of process within the two copying
regimes, trade secrecy and copyright. Section I.A outlines the long-
standing “improper means” limitation on the tort of trade secret mis-
appropriation. Section I.B turns to the copyright system. It first
discusses copyright’s doctrinal indifference to the defendant’s appro-
priation method. It then turns to some inconsistent judicial rhetoric
suggesting that at least some courts are influenced by process consid-
erations, whether they explicitly acknowledge it or not.
A. Trade Secret Law
Consider this epicurean example. In 2007, a finance manager and
cooking enthusiast named Ron Douglas decided to leave Wall Street
in order to spend his time deciphering how to recreate famous restau-
rant dishes.31 One of his top goals was cracking the code to KFC’s
“Original Recipe” fried chicken, based on an undisclosed blend of
herbs and spices that the company had long guarded as a trade
secret.32 At one point, he even tried to bribe KFC cooks, but to no
avail—the seasoning always arrived prepackaged.33 Unable to buy the
answer, he eventually began tapping into a growing online community
of culinary reverse engineers and hired part-time chefs to help him
experiment at home. Over a year and several failed attempts later,34
Douglas finally produced a dish that one reporter described as “the
best KFC I ever had” and “an exact match with the fast food joint.”35
During interviews, Douglas would recount the “pleasure of knowing
that you’ve . . . conquered that recipe and you could make it your-
31 See Jennifer Fermino, Fryin’ on a Wing & a Prayer, N.Y. POST (July 20, 2009), http://
nypost.com/2009/07/20/fryin-on-a-wing-a-prayer; Vidya Rao, Don’t Tell the Colonel! KFC
Recipe May Be Out, TODAY.COM (July 21, 2009), http://www.today.com/food/dont-tell-
colonel-kfc-recipe-may-be-out-2D80556209.
32 On the recipe’s status as a trade secret, see KFC Corp. v. Marion-Kay Co., 620 F.
Supp. 1160, 1172 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Bruce Schreiner, KFC Closely Guards Colonel’s Secret
Chicken Recipe, ASSOC. PRESS NEWSWIRES, July 23, 2005 (describing the great lengths to
which KFC has gone to protect its secret recipe).
33 See Fermino, supra note 31; Rao, supra note 31.
34 See Ron Douglas Masters the Secret Recipe for KFC Chicken, SECRET RECIPES FROM
RON (May 15, 2011), http://secretrecipesfromron.blogspot.com/.
35 Fermino, supra note 31.
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self . . . .”36 His replica recipe can now be yours (no conquering
required) as part of his New York Times best-selling cookbook.37
Assuming that the reporter’s taste test was accurate and that KFC’s
secret is now exposed,38 does KFC have a claim against Douglas for
trade secret misappropriation?
Because of Douglas’s copy process, the answer is no. Under the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, some version of which has been enacted
in almost every state,39 only those who acquire protected information
through “improper means” may be liable.40 Similar limitations appear
in the Restatement (First) of Torts’s early codification of trade secret
doctrine41 as well as in the more recent Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition.42 That rule makes the propriety of the defendant’s pro-
cess a critical issue in trade secret cases.43 Douglas’s conduct was a
form of reverse engineering, which the Supreme Court has called a
“fair and honest means . . . [of] starting with the known product and
working backward to divine the process which aided in its develop-
ment or manufacture.”44 Trade secret law considers it perfectly legiti-
mate.45 Had Douglas instead learned the secret recipe directly from
the employee whom he had tried to bribe—a textbook form of
improper means—the result would have been flipped.46
Trade secrecy’s discrimination between proper and improper
copying methods has a long pedigree. In the 1889 case Tabor v.
36 Ron Douglas, Ron Douglas on Fox and Friends, YOUTUBE (Aug. 2, 2009), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=DCDTq6OOetw (statement beginning at 3:13).
37 See generally RON DOUGLAS, AMERICA’S MOST WANTED RECIPES (2009).
38 According to KFC, which has no interest in conceding that the secret’s out, the
reporter was mistaken. See Rao, supra note 31 (quoting KFC spokesman’s statement,
“Plenty of people have tried to duplicate the recipe over the years, but there is still only
one place to get authentic Original Recipe Chicken—at a KFC restaurant.”).
39 See Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Act.aspx?titletrade+Secrets+Act (showing the UTSA’s adoption in forty-seven states and
the District of Columbia).
40 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
41 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
42 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
43 See, e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir. 1993)
(“Apart from breach of contract, abuse of confidence or impropriety in the means of
procurement, trade secrets may be copied as freely as devices or processes which are not
secret.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1939)).
44 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
45 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (including
reverse engineering within a catalog of proper means).
46 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (including
“bribing or otherwise inducing employees or others to reveal the information in breach of
duty” in a catalog of improper means); see also Liberty Power Corp. v. Katz, No. 10-CV-
1938, 2011 WL 256216, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2011) (finding improper means where the
defendants would not have gained access to the trade secret but for a bribe to the plaintiff’s
employee).
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Hoffman,47 the New York Court of Appeals remarked that once a
medicine is sold to the public, anyone is permitted to use “chemical
analysis and a series of experiments, or . . . any other use of the
medicine itself aided by his own resources only” in order to “discover
the ingredients and their proportions.”48 And, the court continued, if
through that process the experimenter discovers “the secret of the
proprietor, he may use it to any extent that he desires without danger
of interference by the courts.”49 Since then, courts in trade secret
cases have frequently dwelled on the defendant’s process just as much
as the defendant’s product.50
It might be tempting to label this rule a simple protection against
predatory freeriding. Generating valuable information in the first
instance can be expensive, while appropriating it can be cheap, so per-
haps trade secrecy is simply channeling second comers into shoul-
dering enough cost to preserve the original innovator’s ability to
recoup his investment.51 Sure enough, some judicial opinions frame
the improper means inquiry as a test of the defendant’s expendi-
tures.52 As one early case put it, the law should not “advantage the
competitor who by unfair means . . . obtains the desired knowledge
without himself paying the price in labor, money, or machines
expended by the discoverer.”53 The problem with this account,
though, is that trade secret doctrine penalizes even costly and other-
47 23 N.E. 12 (N.Y. 1889).
48 Id. at 13.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1238 (8th
Cir. 1994) (“[T]he critical inquiry is whether the defendant obtained the secret by
‘improper means.’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757(a)); Hurst v. Hughes
Tool Co., 634 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding no improper means where the
defendant acquired information by asking an inventor questions); E. I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (“Anyone is at liberty to
discover a particular trade secret by any fair means, as by experimentation or by
examination and analysis of a particular product. Moreover, upon discovery the idea may
be used with impunity.”); B.C. Ziegler & Co. v. Ehren, 414 N.W.2d 48, 53 (Wis. 1987)
(holding that obtaining discarded customer lists from a scrap paper dealer was improper
means); Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 439 So.2d 43, 49–50 (Ala. 1983) (holding
that acquisition of secret engineering diagrams by searching through scrap metal and trash
was improper means).
51 On the importance of first-mover advantage, see Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra
note 18, at 1586.
52 See, e.g., Lamont v. Vaquillas Energy Lopeno Ltd., 421 S.W.3d 198, 215 (Tex. App.
2013) (“Obtaining knowledge of a trade secret without spending time and resources to
discover it independently is improper . . . .”).
53 A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works, Co. of Ohio, 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir.
1934).
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wise legal methods of appropriation.54 Thus, for example, the Fifth
Circuit imposed liability on a competitor that flew a plane over
DuPont’s still-under-construction methanol plant and photographed
its layout—acts that would have been perfectly lawful but for trade
secret protection.55 Industrial espionage like that can get expensive,
particularly where a surveillance arms race ensues between competi-
tors.56 Of course, it’s not always as expensive as conducting the R&D
in the first instance (if it were, competitors would have no particular
incentive to copy), but the same can be said of legal means like
reverse engineering.57
Trade secrecy’s improper means regime is thus hard to justify on
imitation-cost grounds alone. If the innovator’s ability to recoup R&D
investment is the only thing at stake, it’s not obvious why the law
would differentiate between costly reverse engineering and equally
costly snooping.58 Misappropriation doctrine would need only to bal-
ance the defendant’s imitation costs against the plaintiff’s innovation
costs, regardless of the form that the imitation takes.
A more complete explanation looks at the competitor’s copy pro-
cess not just in terms of its private cost but also in terms of its social
value. Industrial espionage is wasteful. Sifting through trash and
reconstructing shredded documents might give a competitor a hot tip,
but eventually the resources devoted to the activity will outweigh the
value of the secret information itself. There’s little public payoff from
54 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. c (1995) (“The
acquisition of a trade secret can be improper even if the means of acquisition are not
independently wrongful.”).
55 E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
56 See Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
215, 235 (2005) (“[D]o we really believe that DuPont’s rival acquiesced, rather than instead
looking to rent a faster airplane or an airplane that flies at higher altitudes, two among
dozens of adjustments that would have made it more difficult for DuPont to detect the
espionage in the first place?”); Bone, supra note 28, at 298 (“After Christopher, future
trade secret owners will expect competitors to fly over their property at higher altitudes
and use more sophisticated cameras to reduce the likelihood of detection.”).
57 See Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-
Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 731–34 (2014) (describing various costs borne by
innovators that reverse engineers may avoid); Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 18, at
1587 (arguing that a reverse engineer will generally spend less time and money than the
initial innovator because the reverse engineer is able to avoid wasteful expenditures
investigating approaches that do not work, and in part because advances in technology
typically reduce the costs of rediscovery over time).
58 See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights,
61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 322 (2008) (questioning why, under Christopher’s standard, legal
activities like “reverse engineering a chemical, or learning a competitor’s prices by walking
through their store during business hours, or attempting to predict a competitor’s business
strategy based on their market behavior, aren’t similarly cheap efforts to acquire
knowledge that would be expensive to protect”).
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cultivating a brigade of expert dumpster divers.59 Reverse engi-
neering, by contrast, has an immense teaching function. It incubates
useful know-how and reveals opportunities for incremental improve-
ments, benefits that the rest of society reaps. The Supreme Court has
called reverse engineering “an essential part of innovation” that often
results in new products that “may lead to significant advances in the
field.”60 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has noted that the improper
means doctrine “emphasizes the desirability of encouraging inventive
activity by protecting its fruits from efforts at appropriation that are,
indeed, sterile wealth-redistributive—not productive—activities.”61
The doctrine privileges reverse engineering because it “involves the
use of technical skills that we want to encourage.”62 Picking up on this
theme, a number of scholars have emphasized the positive externali-
ties of steering competitors toward reverse engineering in place of
espionage.63 The public gains more from reverse engineering not just
because of the particular products it yields in the short term, but also
because of the valuable skills it breeds in the long term.
The law of trade secrets thus reflects the different welfare effects
of different copy processes. The improper means doctrine sorts
roughly between those appropriation methods that offer enough ben-
efits to pay for themselves and those that don’t. It’s not enough, trade
59 Little, but not zero. Government intelligence agencies can always learn from the
private sector. Cf. Jacob Aron, DARPA’s Shredder Challenge Solved Two Days Early,
NEWSCIENTIST, Dec. 5, 2011 (11:28 AM), http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/onepercent/
2011/12/darpas-shredder-challenge-has.html (describing a Department of Defense
challenge in which “9000 teams compet[ed] to reconstruct five shredded documents using a
combination of computer science and jigsaw-solving skills”).
60 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989).
61 Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991).
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, A Legal Tangle of Secrets and Disclosures in Trade:
Tabor v. Hoffman and Beyond, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE
CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 286 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014)
(“[R]equiring third parties to reverse engineer—rather than use the secret directly—might
also be helpful to the third parties (and society at large) by teaching them more about the
information, its uses, and further refinements.”); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 370
(“[R]everse engineering will often generate knowledge about the product being reverse
engineered that will make it possible to improve it or develop or improve other
products.”); Jerome H. Reichman, How Trade Secrecy Law Generates a Natural
Semicommons of Innovative Know-how, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY
189 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2011) (“[T]he process of reverse engineering itself, by
methodically extracting the innovator’s know-how from a given application, tends to
generate technical improvements over time, including cost-saving modes of manufacture
that reduce prices to consumers.”); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 174 (1999) (“[W]hen competitors do opt for independent
development or reverse engineering, these alternatives channel their investment into
socially useful activity—either option develops productive technological or business
expertise within the firm, rather than wasteful expertise in industrial espionage.”).
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secret doctrine says, to decide cases looking only at a final product,
even when that final product was unabashedly copied from the
owner’s original work. To understand a copy’s value to society, one
also needs to look at the history of its creation.
B. Copyright Law
Copyright’s treatment of the copy process starts out like trade
secrecy’s but quickly diverges. Every copyright case, like every trade
secret case, commences with the question of whether copying has
occurred.64 “[T]wo works may be identical in every detail, but, if the
alleged infringer created the accused work independently . . . , then
there is no infringement.”65 This doctrine allows the Bee Gees to pen
How Deep Is Your Love despite the song’s substantial similarity to a
protected work that the band had never before heard.66 It allows
fashion designer Albert Nipon to create a dress featuring a pattern
substantially similar to a protected work that Nipon had never before
seen.67 And it allows Carnival Cruise Lines to produce a Super Bowl
commercial featuring “lingering shots of the sea, of characters gazing
at the water and . . . a 1962 narration by President John F. Kennedy
about humanity’s connection to and love for the sea” strongly resem-
bling a freelance film bearing all of those same traits that Carnival had
never before viewed (at least so far as anyone can tell).68 The moral of
each of these examples should already be familiar from trade secrecy:
if there is no copying, there is no claim.
Once independent creation can be ruled out, however, copy pro-
cess seems to disappear from the picture. Infringement liability
doesn’t hinge on the ease of copying.69 As one court tidily put it,
“[t]he issue in a copyright[ ] case is simply whether the copyright
holder’s expression has been copied, not how difficult it was to do the
copying.”70 An unauthorized copy is supposed to be equally infringing
64 See supra note 29.
65 Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984).
66 Id. at 901–06.
67 Cameron Indus. v. Albert Nipon Co., 630 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
68 Allan Brettman, Coincidences in Carnival Cruise Line’s Super Bowl Ad Catches
Attention of Portland Filmmaker, THE OREGONIAN (Feb. 3, 2015, 3:31 PM) http://
www.oregonlive.com/playbooksprofits/index.ssf/2015/02/coincidences_in_
carnival_cruis.html.
69 See supra note 10; cf. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 370 (“A law that forbade
deliberately appropriating trade secrets by either theft or reverse engineering would be
closely analogous to copyright law, which penalizes copying.”).
70 Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1237 (3d Cir. 1986); see
also Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (observing that
copyright’s inquiry into unlawful copying turns on “whether [the defendant’s] end
product . . . is substantially similar to [the plaintiff’s], not how it got that way”); Lasercomb
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whether it was spat out by a machine or painstakingly produced by
hand.71 According to the leading copyright treatise, it is “funda-
mental” that copyright “protects against unauthorized copying not
only in the original medium in which the work was produced, but also
in any other medium as well. Thus copyright in a photograph will pre-
clude unauthorized copying by drawing or in any other form, as well
as by photographic reproduction.”72 Copyright doctrine cares about
these processes’ observable artifacts rather than about the processes
themselves.
A good example of copy process’s black-letter irrelevance is
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates.73 In that case, an author writing
a book on President Kennedy’s assassination sought a license to
include a series of reproduced frames from the famous Zapruder film.
The copyright owner refused. “Doubtless having in mind the
probability of an action for infringement,” the court surmised, the
author and his publisher hired a graphic artist to make charcoal draw-
ings of the individual frames rather than reproducing them photo-
graphically.74 Although the court ultimately held that reproducing
these shots for the purpose of historical commentary was a fair use, it
went out of its way to brush aside the act of manual recreation. The
artist’s “so-called ‘sketches,’” according to the court, “[we]re in fact
copies of the copyrighted film. That they were done in charcoal by an
‘artist’ is of no moment.”75
But for the backstop of fair use—which had everything to do with
authorial purpose and nothing to do with authorial process—the
defendants would have been liable for infringement. Indeed, that pre-
cise outcome occurred in a later case that involved similar manual
reproduction without the commentary on historical events. In Peker v.
Masters Collection,76 the defendant was a retail company in the busi-
ness of producing replicas of famous oil paintings, at least some of
which remained under copyright. The company would first apply
acrylic paint to poster-sized prints and then, once the acrylic had
absorbed the image from the poster ink, mount it on a canvas.77 Next,
Am., Inc. v. Holiday Steel Rule Die Corp., 656 F. Supp. 612, 616 (M.D.N.C. 1987)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that its “very laborious and expensive process” should
weigh against infringement liability).
71 See Burk, supra note 10, at 599.
72 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[E]
(2015).
73 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
74 Id. at 138.
75 Id. at 144.
76 96 F. Supp. 2d 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
77 Id. at 217–18.
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“specially trained artists” would apply oil paint to the canvas to match
the brush strokes of the original as closely as possible.78 Finally, the
company would apply a thin veneer of protective varnish and frame
the piece, leaving a final product that looked and felt, in the defen-
dant’s own words, “virtually indistinguishable from the original oil
painting masterpiece.”79 The court held that these reproductions
infringed the owner’s copyright, notwithstanding the considerable
labor that the defendant had to invest in order to make a convincing
replica.80
Another court recently reached a similar result in an appropria-
tion art case. In Friedman v. Guetta,81 an artist recreated a photograph
of the musical group Run DMC by stripping out the background and
any shading, projecting that altered image onto a large piece of wood,
painting the image onto the wood, and then gluing 1000 shards of
broken vinyl records on top of it.82 The end result was an “almost
exact[ ] replicat[ion]” of the outline of each group member’s figure.83
When the owner of the copyright in the photograph sued, the artist
asserted a fair use defense. The court rejected it, holding that the
artist’s use was not sufficiently “distinct” as to render it a permissible
transformation of the plaintiff’s work.84 That fair use finding was
based on the similar end products. The process, jigsawing vinyl record
shards into that recognizable product, didn’t enter the analysis.
The Time and Peker decisions seem to stand for the proposition
that a copyist’s process does not affect the infringement inquiry. The
Friedman case appears to apply that proposition, even if silently. To
determine liability, copyright primarily asks “what” questions—in
large part, what elements of the copyrighted work the defendant
copied. The fair use doctrine tacks on a “why” question, inquiring into
the defendant’s reason for making the copy.85 These two sets of ques-
78 Id. at 218.
79 Id. at 219.
80 Id. at 220–21.
81 No. CV 10-00014, 2011 WL 3510890 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2011).
82 Id. at *1.
83 Id. at *5. The original photograph and the recreation at issue can be found at Sean
Bonner, Thierry Guetta, aka Mr. Brainwash Sued for Copyright Infringement Over Run
DMC Image, BOINGBOING (Jan. 6, 2011, 10:30 AM) http://boingboing.net/2011/01/26/
thierry-guetta-aka-m.html.
84 Friedman, 2011 WL 3510890, at *6.
85 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012) (directing courts to consider the “purpose and
character of the use” of the work); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2006)
(finding fair use because the defendant’s “purposes in using [the copyright owner’s] image
are sharply different from [the owner’s] goals in creating it”); R. Anthony Reese,
Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 467 (2008)
(concluding based on review of appellate decisions that “in evaluating transformativeness
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tions, what and why, cover the entire landscape of the infringement
inquiry. Copyright doctrine appears uninterested in asking “how.”86
Nevertheless, the doctrine doesn’t fully capture the reality of all
copyright litigation. One of the most prominent copyright cases of the
last decade, Fairey v. Associated Press,87 featured an extensive dispute
over copy process. Graphic artist Shepard Fairey used an unlicensed
AP photograph of Barack Obama in creating the ubiquitous image
from the 2008 presidential campaign popularly known as the “Hope
Poster.”88 Fairey filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment of
non-infringement. Although the case ultimately settled before the
court issued a definitive ruling, Fairey argued throughout the litigation
that the elements he copied from the photograph weren’t copyright-
able expression and that, even if they were, the copying would still be
permitted as fair use.89 Neither argument ought to implicate copy pro-
cess. Even so, Fairey fought to prove that his method of converting the
photograph into his poster image required great expertise and many
hours of labor hand-cutting rubylith films, rather than a simple
Photoshop job that the AP alleged to be “a form of computerized
‘paint by numbers.’”90 Consistent with conventional doctrine, the AP
argued that the entire factual dispute was immaterial.91 At the same
the courts focus more on the purpose of a defendant’s use than on any alteration the
defendant has made to the content of the plaintiff’s work”).
86 To be sure, fair use does immunize some copying in the course of reverse engineering
software, but only where it is an intermediate step toward developing an end product that
isn’t substantially similar to the original. The focus, in other words, remains on what the
final output looks like, regardless of the process through which it’s produced. See Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1528 (9th Cir. 1992) (permitting a reverse
engineer to copy software elements while in the process of developing interoperable
programs but noting that “[o]ur conclusion does not, of course, insulate [the reverse
engineer] from a claim of copyright infringement with respect to its finished products”);
Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 843, 845 n.8 (1994) (observing that Sega doesn’t allow “using software reverse
engineering to produce infringing copies of the original software. Surely an infringing
computer program would be viewed as infringing by a court without regard to the process
by which it was produced.”).
87 Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Fairey v.
Associated Press, No. 09-1123 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009). On the case’s notoriety, see Eva
E. Subotnik, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and Creativity, 76 BROOK.
L. REV. 1487, 1487 (2011) (introducing the Fairey litigation as “[t]he recent copyright ‘case’
ce´le`bre”).
88 For background on the case, see generally William W. Fisher III et al., Reflections on
the Hope Poster Case, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 243 (2012).
89 Id. at 257.
90 The Associated Press’s First Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaims at 41, Fairey, No. 09-01123 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2009); see also Fisher et al.,
supra note 88, at 252 n.39.
91 See, e.g., Associated Press’s Motion in Limine No. 3 to Exclude Evidence of Fairey’s
Use of Rubylith and for an Adverse Inference at 4, Fairey, No. 09-01123 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
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time, it continued to stress its version of the facts: Fairey’s copying was
trivially easy to do.92
If copyright doctrine says the copy process doesn’t matter, why
litigate the issue? Perhaps because the labor involved in an act of
copying can sway jurors’ minds. To begin with, hardworking copyists
might seem more sympathetic than do their stereotypically freeriding
counterparts. Moreover, those labor-intensive copies might strike
viewers as more expressively compelling than cut-and-paste digital
reproductions (more on this below).93 Either effect would seem to
place a thumb on the defendant’s side of the scale.94
In fact, juries may not be the only decisionmakers receptive to
such arguments. Judges, too, sometimes subtly invoke the defendant’s
process when ostensibly assessing the propriety of the defendant’s
product, despite process’s black-letter irrelevance. Probably the most
recognizable touchstone for the notion that process can influence case
outcomes is the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.95 There, Time Magazine had
purchased the exclusive right to print prepublication excerpts from
President Gerald Ford’s forthcoming memoir, only to be “scoop[ed]”
by the defendant, a competitor that had received an unauthorized
copy of the manuscript.96 When the promise of exclusivity was lost,
Time cancelled the agreement, and the book’s publisher sued.
10, 2011) (“The particular process whereby Mr. Fairey copied the Obama Photo—
completely digitally or partially digitally and partially using Rubylith—is totally irrelevant
because copyright law simply does not take into account ‘sweat of the brow.’” (quoting
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1991))); Associated Press’s
Motion in Limine No. 5 to Preclude Obey Clothing from Presenting Fairey’s Expert
Witnesses at Trial at 8, Fairey, No. 09-01123 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2011) (“[O]pinions about
how Shepard Fairey may have made the Obama Image are not relevant to the issue of
whether the Obama Image is substantially similar to the Obama Photograph. . . . [T]he
impression that a copy leaves with the ordinary lay observer . . . is the touchstone for
determining infringement.”).
92 Fisher et al., supra note 88, at 252 n.39 (summarizing deposition testimony in which
AP’s expert witness “contended that he himself was able to create an approximation of the
Hope Poster using an ‘all-digital process’ that mimicked the traditional rubylith-based
technique but performed all of the steps on the computer—and that, moreover, [he] was
able to do so in only ninety minutes”).
93 See infra Section II.B.
94 At least one commentator has made a similar argument. See Bruce E. Boyden, The
Obama “Hope” Poster Case—How Was the Poster Created?, MARQ. U. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG
(Feb. 27, 2009) http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2009/02/27/the-obama-%E2%80%9
Chope%E2%80%9D-poster-case-%E2%80%94-how-was-the-poster-created/
(“[A]tmospherically . . . it just seems easier to credit a claim of substantial similarity, or
conversely harder to credit a claim of fair use, if Fairey copied the original and altered it
down, rather than creating a similar-looking version from the bottom up . . . .”).
95 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
96 Id. at 542.
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Rejecting the defendant’s fair use argument, the Court emphasized
that the doctrine relies in part on “the propriety of the defendant’s
conduct.”97 The fact that the defendant had “knowingly exploited a
purloined manuscript” therefore significantly weakened its case.98
While the Supreme Court’s reasoning doesn’t directly speak to recrea-
tions versus duplications, the conduct-centered move that it makes
opens the door to such comparisons.99 Under Harper & Row, courts
may scrutinize not just end products but the circumstances through
which they’re brought into being.
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court’s most
recent foray into the fair use doctrine, the Court separated between
fair users and the paradigmatically wrongful copyists who copy in
order to “avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.”100 The
dichotomy between the freeriding copyist and the hardworking orig-
inal creator has a long and familiar history in copyright jurispru-
dence,101 but Campbell’s rhetoric suggests the dichotomy runs even
deeper. Drudgery doesn’t just distinguish creators from copyists; it
also separates among copyists. The fair use analysis involves, as the
Second Circuit put it in another case, “an inquiry into the infringer’s
creative effort.”102
One can find similar narratives across a number of judicial opin-
ions. Take, for example, Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,103 in
which the Second Circuit found fair use where an advertisement for
the film Naked Gun 33 1/3 mimicked Annie Leibovitz’s famous pho-
tograph of an unclothed and seven-months-pregnant Demi Moore.
The court permitted the advertisement, which featured male come-
dian Leslie Nielsen’s head superimposed onto a female body, as a
parody of Leibovitz’s work.104 That’s a product rationale, not a pro-
cess one, and it’s the rationale for which the case is always cited. But
97 Id. at 562.
98 Id. at 563.
99 Though the Supreme Court didn’t dwell on the defendant’s labor, the dissenting
judge in the court below did. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723
F.2d 195, 214 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill, J., dissenting), rev’d, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (taking the
position, ultimately vindicated by the Supreme Court’s reversal of the majority’s decision,
that the copying at issue should be distinguished from prior fair use findings because the
defendant had not done “a substantial amount of original research”).
100 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).
101 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2005) (describing courts’ and commentators’ “almost obsessive
preoccupation with identifying and rooting out that great evil of the modern economic
world—free riding”).
102 Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1986).
103 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
104 Id. at 117 (holding that the balance of the four fair use factors favored the defendant
parodist).
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seldom noticed is the court’s discussion of the creative labors that the
defendant took to evoke the original: “[R]ather than mechanically
copying the portion of the original Leibovitz photograph depicting
Moore’s body, Paramount commissioned another photograph to be
taken of a nude, pregnant woman, similarly posed. Great effort was
made to ensure that the photograph resembled in meticulous detail
the one taken by Leibovitz.”105 If process doesn’t figure into the anal-
ysis of this “meticulous[ly] detail[ed]” resemblance, there should be
no difference between the defendant’s from-scratch recreation and
the sort of “mechanical copying” from which the court took pains to
distance it. The court’s framing of the defendant’s process as the
opposite of mechanical copying suggests that the process was signifi-
cant for (even if not decisive of) its case.
Likewise, in Fuentes v. Mega Media Holdings, Inc.,106 the court
held that fair use protected a video journalist who used copyrighted
footage as part of commentary that, the court stressed, “was no mere
cut-and-paste job.”107 The defendant “did much more than merely re-
run the videos in a different context,” going so far as to “select[ ]
which scenes out of the hours of video they would broadcast during
the show on each particular night and invite[ ] guests onto the show
that could (and did) provide insight into and commentary on those
scenes.”108 As in Leibovitz, it’s not clear why any of these facts would
matter in a product-centered copyright regime. And yet Fuentes tell-
ingly falls back on how much the defendant did, not just what he pro-
duced. Other cases dealing with research and journalism take a similar
approach.109
Contrast the Fuentes and Leibovitz defendants with the defen-
dant in Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.110
There, the defendants wrote a send-up of the O.J. Simpson murder
trial in the style of Dr. Seuss’s The Cat in the Hat.111 Rejecting their
fair use defense, the Ninth Circuit invoked the Supreme Court’s
“drudgery” language.112 The satire, according to the court, evinced
105 Id. at 111.
106 No. 09-22979-CIV, 2011 WL 2601356 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2011), report and
recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 2609550 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2011).
107 Id. at *9.
108 Id. at *10.
109 See supra note 99 (discussing the dissent from the Second Circuit majority’s decision
in Harper, later reversed by the Supreme Court); New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry
Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1525 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989)
(finding fair use where an author quoted copyrighted material not to engage in
“opportunistic free riding” but rather to produce a “laboriously researched” biography).
110 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
111 Id. at 1396.
112 Id. at 1401 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994)).
876 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:855
“no effort to create a transformative work.”113 Here again, the court is
speaking in terms of what the producer did rather than what the
product is.
Even beyond fair use, the copy process might be playing an unac-
knowledged role. In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,114 the
Sixth Circuit rejected a de minimis defense for music sampling on the
rationale that “if an artist wants to incorporate a ‘riff’ from another
work in his or her recording, he is free to duplicate the sound of that
‘riff’ in the studio.”115 Like the fair use cases, Bridgeport emphasizes
an implicit narrative that handmade recreations are privileged while
mechanical reproductions are not. Better to work for your copies.
In these cases, copy process may be lurking beneath copyright’s
doctrinal surface after all. If the judicial rhetoric finds no foothold in
contemporary doctrine, it can at least claim some fidelity to copy-
right’s early history. Students in every copyright course learn that an
author’s sheer investment and effort, or “sweat of the brow” in legal
parlance, are insufficient for earning IP protection.116 But although
sweat of the brow is today a discredited copyrightability issue focused
on the plaintiff, it actually began as a legitimate infringement issue
focused on the defendant.117 Prior to the twentieth century, courts
asked whether a second comer bestowed enough “new toil and
talent”118 or “care and pains”119 to avoid infringement. The currency
113 Id. (emphasis added).
114 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
115 Id. at 801.
116 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352–54 (1991) (finding
the sweat of the brow doctrine flouts basic copyright principles); see also Meshwerks, Inc.
v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n assessing the
originality of a work for which copyright protection is sought, we look only at the final
product, not the process, and the fact that intensive, skillful, and even creative labor is
invested in the process of creating a product does not guarantee its copyrightability.”);
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Protection
derives from the features of the work itself, not the effort that goes into it.”).
117 See Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation
of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1573 (1963) (“[C]ourts [applying the sweat of the brow
doctrine] were not speaking of requisites to procuring copyright; their language was not
meant to be descriptive of the sort of efforts that would achieve the minimum ‘originality’
to be protected by law. The courts were merely stating that the defendant in the cases
before them had not engaged in enough original work to prevent a finding of
infringement.”); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1880 (1990) (discussing early
courts’ “longstanding practice of protecting information, qua information, when a rival
engaged in what the courts perceived to be inadequate effort of his own”); Matthew Sag,
The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1402–03 (2011) (noting nineteenth-
century cases’ emphasis on the defendant’s intellectual labor).
118 Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511, 517 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847).
119 Burnett v. Chetwood (1721) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008, 1009; 2 Mer. 441, 441.
October 2016] THE COPY PROCESS 877
of the realm was the defendant’s “exercise of skill, or labor, or
expense.”120 Indeed, the case that originated the fair use doctrine in
U.S. law, Folsom v. Marsh,121 contrasted the fair user’s “intellectual
labor and judgment” with the infringer’s “facile use of scissors.”122
More recently, the same judicial impulse can be found in cases
addressing the compulsory license for musical compositions under the
now-superseded 1909 Copyright Act. That statute provided that once
a composer had licensed the recording of a musical work, anyone else
could make a “similar use” of that work by paying the statutorily-
determined royalty.123 Then, as today, the compulsory license per-
mitted cover songs—that is, songs re-recorded by second comers. But
in the 1970s, defendants in several cases tried to invoke the compul-
sory license to allow even the unauthorized duplication of existing
sound recordings themselves. Just as in Bridgeport thirty years later,
courts rejected the argument out of hand. The Seventh Circuit, for
example, determined that “duplicating a recording is not similar to
making a recording of the composition. The duplicator does not take
the composition as ‘raw material’ and go through the creative and
financial steps of producing a recording.”124 Similarly, the Third
Circuit offered this process-focused explanation:
The use to which the original licensee put the composer’s work, i.e.,
the musical score, was much more elaborate, involving as it did the
preparation of an arrangement from the written composition and its
performance by musicians and vocalists. The mere duplication of a
recording by the pirate is not the same as, or “similar” to, the efforts
made by the original licensee in utilizing the characters on a piece of
paper as the basic plan for producing harmonious sounds.125
Highlighting the process/product distinction even more starkly,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that mechanical duplication was beyond
the compulsory license’s scope because “[t]he end product, of course,
is not only ‘similar’ but virtually indistinguishable; the process, how-
ever, is completely dissimilar.”126 Similar decisions from that era
abound.127 Modern practitioners may be familiar with the version of
120 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
121 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
122 Id. at 345.
123 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970).
124 Heilman v. Bell, 583 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1978) (quoting Edward B. Marks Music
Corp. v. Colo. Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285, 288 (10th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1120 (1975)).
125 Jondora Music Publ’g Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 395 (3d Cir.
1974).
126 Fame Publ’g Co. v. Ala. Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667, 669–70 (5th Cir. 1975).
127 See, e.g., Edwards B. Marks Music Corp., 497 F.2d at 288 (“Magnetics may make its
own arrangement, hire its own musicians and artists, and then record. It does not mean
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this rule that is now codified in the current Copyright Act.128 It was
the courts, though, that first articulated the principle that the process
of recreating sound recordings in the studio should be legally favored
over the process of mechanically duplicating them.
Thus, the notion that copyright doctrine would assess the defen-
dant’s labor is hardly unprecedented. Despite this historical lineage,
however, the present-day role of copy process remains frustratingly
subterranean. Whatever influence the defendant’s appropriation
methods might have behind the scenes, the black-letter infringement
rule continues to insist that process is beside the point.
If the doctrine and the rhetoric can’t both be right, there are two
possible ways to proceed. Courts could cut back on the process talk,
confirming that copyright cases are decided based on end products
just as the doctrine intends. Or they could embrace that same talk by
moving closer to trade secrecy and expressly incorporating the copy
process into the infringement analysis.129 How to make that decision is
the subject of the next Part.
that Magnetics may use the composer’s copyrighted work by duplicating and copying the
record of a licensed recording company. Such, in our view, is not a similar use.”); United
States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974) (“The statute, as amended,
places no impediment to the defendants collecting their own talent and technicians to
imitate on a new tape or record a performance embodied on the protected sound
recording.”); Fame Publ’g Co. v. S & S Distribs., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 984, 988 (N.D. Ala.
1973) (holding that duplicating sound recordings was an “identical use,” rather than the
statutorily required “similar use,” and that consequently “[a]nyone who seeks to rely on
the compulsory license premium must hire some musicians, take them into a studio and
make his own recording”); see also Æolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926, 927
(W.D.N.Y. 1912) (holding that the statutory license did not permit a player piano-roll
manufacturer to “avail himself of the skill and labor of the original manufacturer of the
perforated roll or record by copying or duplicating the same,” and that statutory licensees
must instead “resort to the copyrighted composition or sheet music, and not pirate the
work of a competitor who has made an original perforated roll”).
128 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (conditioning the statutory license in cases of mechanical
duplication, but not in cases of recreation from scratch, on receiving permission from the
owner of the separate copyright in the duplicated sound recording); H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1476, at 108 (1976) (noting that under § 115, “a person is not entitled to a compulsory
license of copyrighted musical works for the purpose of making an unauthorized
duplication of a musical sound recording originally developed and produced by another”).
129 One could imagine a third possibility: that the status quo actually enhances welfare
through a form of acoustic separation between on-the-books doctrine and frequent judicial
practice. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (advancing a theory of acoustic
separation through which the criminal law may project a stringent set of rules to shape
public perception of permissible conduct and a more lenient set of rules to govern how
officials should treat that conduct). But whatever value acoustic separation might have in
other contexts, I’m skeptical that it has much here. Acoustic separation is justified, the
argument goes, where the perceived strictness of a rule elicits desirable behavior from the
relevant public. Id. at 645 (explaining that greater latitude given by courts to defenses like
duress or necessity may reflect a belief that they will not lead to negative signaling to the
October 2016] THE COPY PROCESS 879
II
HOW TO EVALUATE COPY PROCESS
Employing a particular copy process affects multiple constituen-
cies, from creators to copiers to consumers. Some of those effects
might be more acute when the copied products are technological,
others when the copied products are cultural. It’s thus not self-evident
that trade secrecy and copyright should treat the copy process simi-
larly. Perhaps, it might be argued, the usual justifications for trade
secrecy’s improper means doctrine—the market-insulating effect of
high imitation costs and the educational benefits of reverse engi-
neering—don’t apply to copyrightable works, except possibly in the
case of functional expression like software.130 Or, even if those justifi-
cations apply, perhaps they’re outweighed by costs that are especially
severe within the context of the copyright system.
In this Part, I contend that these views would be mistaken. Cul-
tural works like fine art and film are in fact subject to similar justifica-
tions as the industrial knowledge of the trade secret regime. Indeed,
certain arguments may be even stronger for such works because audi-
ences value expressive replicas in a way that consumers of technology
and business know-how do not. The key is to recognize the difference
between acts of mechanical duplication and acts of hands-on recrea-
tion that trace the original author’s creative steps. Those two activities
are unfortunately lumped together whenever copyright doctrine
speaks of “copying” as a single, uniform process—which is, essentially,
whenever copyright doctrine speaks of copying at all. Once recrea-
tions are properly unbundled from copyright’s sprawling notion of the
copy, it becomes easier to see their benefits for both copier and con-
public). The goal is to deter more conduct than a simple decision rule could alone. See id.
at 670 (offering the example of the duress defense, where widespread knowledge “might
move people to succumb to threats under circumstances in which such a decision, though
personally rational, would be socially undesirable”). Broadcasting the irrelevance of copy
process doesn’t fit that mold. Costly overdeterrence is a greater risk in copyright cases than
in the criminal cases around which the acoustic separation theory began. See id. at 638 n.29
(warning of the welfare losses from overdeterrence). Society likely benefits from a wider
range of behavior at the margins of fair use doctrine than at the margins of murder,
burglary, and other core offenses. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Essay,
Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1497–98 (2007) (outlining the foregone social value
of fair uses that the copyright system unnecessarily deters); Christopher Buccafusco &
Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic Analysis of Criminal
Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 288–89 (2014) (noting that in intentional
murder cases, unlike negligence torts, “the magnitude of the harm will always exceed the
costs of avoiding it”). As a result, even borderline fair use cases don’t merit the extra
dollop of deterrence that acoustic separation provides.
130 Cf. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 18, at 1650 (observing that until copyright
subject matter expanded to include software, reverse engineering wasn’t a significant
policy lever for copyright law).
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sumer, as well as their comparatively weak threat to the original cre-
ator. As the sections below discuss, the copy process belongs in the
welfare calculus for technological and cultural appropriation alike.
A. Incentives and Imitation Costs
According to the standard economic-incentives account, the case
for IP protection becomes stronger, all else being equal, as copying
becomes easier. IP rights target a particular public-goods problem:
when it’s costly to innovate but cheap to imitate, an innovator may be
unable to recoup fixed costs and so decide to forego the enterprise
altogether. In order to make innovation a more palatable investment,
IP law artificially raises the cost of others’ imitation. But if imitation is
naturally costly to begin with, the need for legal intervention is
weak.131
Optimal IP strength thus depends on the process through which
creation and copying occur. Technological advances often make
copying cheaper over time. If imitation costs fall more quickly than do
innovation costs, IP may need to shoulder a greater burden tomorrow
than it does today.132 Copyright incentives, for example, become more
important as copyists move from rewriting manuscripts by hand to
operating a printing press to hitting a few keystrokes on a com-
puter.133 The Internet has been dubbed “the world’s biggest copying
131 See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 42 (“[M]odern technology has
reduced the time it takes to make copies, as well as enabled perfect or near-perfect copies
to be made at low cost, and as a result the importance of copyright protection has
increased for many types of expressive works.”); id. at 51 (“The higher the cost of a copy
relative to that of the original, the smaller is the advantage to the copier from not having
borne any part of the cost of creating the original.”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1585 (2003) (“If imitation is impossible
even in the absence of patent protection, there is little need for the incentives patents
provide. Even assuming imitation is possible, if it is sufficiently expensive or time
consuming the inventor may be able to make enough money to justify the cost of R&D.”
(footnote omitted)); Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics
Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 66 (2005) (noting that “if the costs of copying are high,”
no IP regulation may be necessary “because the market will exclude copiers without the
aid of the law”); Roin, supra note 57, at 734 (“Patent scholars occasionally simplify the
economic analysis of optimal patent strength into a quick rule of thumb: The need for
patent protection is a function of the ratio of total R&D costs to total imitation costs.”).
132 An important caveat is that if the cost of innovation falls sufficiently, IP incentives
become unnecessary. The bare fact that copying grows easier thus shouldn’t be a one-way
ratchet expanding IP protection. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 50 (contending
that even while improved technology has reduced the cost of copying, that same
technology has also “reduc[ed] the cost of expression” and along with it “the importance of
copyright protection as a means for enabling the recovery of the cost of expression”).
133 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 51 (discussing the expense of producing
books following the invention of the printing press).
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machine.”134 Patent rights similarly take on heightened significance as
advances in design and prototyping tools facilitate quicker reverse
engineering and reduce first-mover advantages.135
This increasing ease of copying has more than once induced
Congress to extend IP exclusivity to media not previously protected.
Sound recordings, for example, weren’t made copyrightable until
1972, by which point the technological hurdles facing so-called record
pirates had dwindled sufficiently.136 Boat hull designs earned their
own federal exclusivity regime in 1998, after the rise of plug-molding
enabled reverse engineering them with trivial ease.137 Semiconductor
chips, too, received special protection in 1984 in response to increas-
ingly effective cloning technology.138 Dynamic technological change
thus raises copy process’s significance for appropriate IP policy.
And there’s more. Even when looking at a static snapshot at a
given moment in history, typical imitation costs will vary across dif-
ferent IP-intensive industries. Particular inventions and expressive
media remain harder to copy than others.139 A generic drug is techno-
134 Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Stephen Summer, Music on the Internet: Can the Present Laws and Treaties
Protect Music Copyright in Cyberspace?, 8 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 31, 32 (1999)).
135 See Roin, supra note 57, at 733 (noting the advancements in reverse engineering
complex biological compounds); see also Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Economics of
Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable Goods, 81 MINN. L. REV. 693, 733 (1997)
(“Innovations are becoming inherently more copyable. Copying technologies are becoming
faster, cheaper, and more accessible. Patent law’s implicit assumption that lead time
advantages adequately protect unpatentable innovation is becoming correspondingly
unrealistic.”).
136 See, e.g., Harry Surden, Technological Cost as Law in Intellectual Property, 27 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 135, 138 (2014) (“The absence of a positive legal right over sound recordings
[before 1972] was . . . partly explainable because technological limitations were, in effect,
reliably performing the constraining function normally performed by copyright law.”).
137 See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 18, at 1591–94 (describing state and federal
attempts to protect boat hull designs from plug-molding). In 1989, the Supreme Court held
that federal law preempted state statutes attempting to provide “patent-like protection”
for boat hull designs. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168
(1989). Nearly a decade later, Congress plugged the gap (so to speak) by enacting the
Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2905 (1998) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1332).
138 See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–914). On the decline of imitation costs preceding
the act’s passage, see Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 18, at 1598.
139 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 131, at 1585 (noting that the time and cost of
imitation varies depending on the invention and industry).
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logically easier to produce than is a copycat jetliner.140 A DVD is
easier to duplicate than a dramatic stage production is to reenact.141
IP policymakers have multiple options for how to respond to this
diversity in innovation-cost-to-imitation-cost ratios. First, Congress
could statutorily increase or decrease protection for specific classes of
products. Indeed, it has already done just that in a variety of settings.
From the sui generis schemes for semiconductors and boat hulls142 to
the labyrinthine, industry-specific exemptions that run through the
Copyright Act143 to the occasional one-off carve-outs from the Patent
Act’s otherwise general standards,144 statutory IP law has seen its fair
share of technological idiosyncrasy. Surveying jurisdictions beyond
the United States reveals other examples. Italy, for one, has inserted
imitation costs directly into its statutory limitations on copyright, per-
mitting copying for personal use “when made by hand or by a means
of reproduction unsuitable for circulating or diffusing the work in
public.”145 Nonetheless, policymakers shouldn’t rely heavily on legis-
lative fixes to calibrate IP scope for particular copy processes. As
others have discussed at length, such an approach would be cumber-
some, vulnerable to industry capture, and likely to produce results
destined for quick obsolescence.146
A second, more promising option looks to the courts. Courts
adjudicating infringement cases could expand the scope of IP protec-
tion along some dimension when imitation is easy and contract it
when imitation is hard.147 From an evidentiary standpoint, the sim-
140 See F.M. Scherer, Pharmaceutical Innovation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS
OF INNOVATION 539, 560–61 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010)
(contrasting the cheap development of generic drugs to costly aircraft manufacturing,
where “[e]ven without patents, the firm that would seek to imitate the Boeing 787 would
have to build its own scale models, perform its own wind tunnel tests . . . spending very
nearly as much as Boeing did to develop its 787”).
141 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 42 (noting that despite modern copying
technology, plays still take a significant amount of time to duplicate).
142 See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
143 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108–122 (2012) (providing for various “limitations on exclusive
rights”); Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 105–08 (2004)
(describing the limitations).
144 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012) (allowing generic drug companies to make
certain uses of patented pharmaceuticals); Id. 287(c) (prohibiting enforcement of medical
procedure patents against doctors).
145 PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT:
PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 381 (3d ed. 2012) (quoting Legge 22 aprile 1941, n.633, in
G.U. July 16, 1941, n.166 (It.)).
146 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 131, at 1634–38 (cataloging the flaws of industry-
specific patent legislation).
147 For an analogous proposal targeting protectability, rather than infringement, see id.
at 1661 (noting that “[w]here R&D costs are especially high relative to the costs of
imitation, lowering the standards for patentability may increase the incentive to invest in
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plest approach would be to consult the typical imitation process used
within the relevant industry.148 An industry-wide inquiry would spare
the court the burden of determining in each case how costly the par-
ticular defendant’s copying was relative to the particular plaintiff’s
innovation. There is an accuracy tradeoff to that administrability gain,
however. Just because the average imitator can work cheaply doesn’t
mean that all imitators will. Some may proceed through more compli-
cated and costly methods. Some, for example, might seek to teach
themselves something about the product by building it anew.149 For
cultural works, others might wish to express something through a par-
ticular recreation process.150 In either scenario, copyists aren’t always
using the cheapest and fastest methods available to them. In some
cases, the cost of imitating will not lag far behind the cost of creating
in the first instance.151 A legal standard that reflects only the possible
imitation costs, rather than the defendant’s actual ones, will penalize
more behavior than it needs to.
Thus, putting aside administration costs for the moment,152 an
infringement regime would ideally sort defendants according to their
individual copy processes. Trade secret doctrine already does this
through its improper means inquiry.153 Copyright law does not, with
the notable exception of the compulsory “cover” license for musical
works discussed above.154 That exception, though, provides some
proof of concept for how courts might incorporate imitation costs into
the copyright infringement analysis. The statutory text in force during
the rise of tape piracy in the early 1970s, unlike the one in force today,
innovation by increasing the likelihood of financial reward” and suggesting that “the
Federal Circuit could take account of the cost and uncertainty of post-invention
development . . . by creating a new secondary consideration of nonobviousness that
measures the cost of innovation”).
148 See id. at 1662 (arguing that examining an industry as a whole would be more
efficient than assessing each innovation individually).
149 See infra Section II.C. (describing the phenomenon of “learning by doing”).
150 See infra Section II.B. (discussing various recreations that made statements unique
and distinct from those of the original works).
151 Indeed, imitation costs could conceivably be greater. See George E. Newman & Paul
Bloom, Art and Authenticity: The Importance of Originals in Judgments of Value, 141 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 558, 563 (2012) (“[A]rtistic originals are not always more
difficult to create than artistic duplicates. For instance, the time required to identically
duplicate an abstract painting by Jackson Pollock may be greater than the time that it took
to produce the original.”); EVELYN TOYNTON, JACKSON POLLOCK (2012) (recounting how
appropriation artist Mike Bidlo “had thought it would be easy to [re]create a Pollock,” yet
“it took him months of dogged practice to come up with anything credible”).
152 These costs are discussed infra Section II.D.
153 See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 18, at 1590 (defending trade secrecy’s
allowance of reverse engineering because “the costs and time required for reverse
engineering already protect most innovators”).
154 See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text.
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did not expressly distinguish between mechanical duplication and
rerecording from scratch.155 Nevertheless, imitation costs drove courts
to reach the same result anyway through their interpretation of the
statute’s open-ended “similar use” clause.156 As one court explained
its decision to withhold the license from mechanical duplicators:
[W]hile the difference between making a recording and duplicating
a recording (making a recording of a recording) may seem negli-
gible semantically, the impact of the latter upon the copyright
interest of the composer is clear. The copyright holder’s benefit is
substantially reduced by the inevitable lower profits which result
from duplicators who can re-record for a fraction of the original cost
and thus undersell the authorized recorder.157
Though these cases were limited to a specific statutory license for
musical works, they offer a blueprint for analyzing other recreations
as well. One could easily apply the same reasoning to, say, recreated
photographs158 or paintings.159 Indeed, as I argue below in Part III,
the Copyright Act’s fair use provision already gives courts an analo-
gous statutory foothold for doing just that.160 Considering the imita-
tion costs actually borne by particular copyright defendants is both
precedented and feasible.
B. Process Preferences
While imitation costs present a familiar story in the IP literature,
individual preferences for particular copy processes do not. That
absence is surprising. Within other legal fields, both the courts and the
academy have begun to confront the notion that people may care not
just about what a product is but also about how it gets to be that
way.161 IP has lagged behind.
155 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970) (amended 1976) (establishing a compulsory license
for “mak[ing] a similar use of the copyrighted work”), with 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2012)
(denying the compulsory license to one who merely “duplicat[es] a sound recording fixed
by another” unless one also receives separate permission from the owner of the copyright
in the copied sound recording).
156 See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text (discussing how various courts
distinguished between “covering” songs and mere duplication).
157 Heilman v. Bell, 583 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1978).
158 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
159 See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
160 See infra Part III (discussing the “character of the use” factor under 17 U.S.C.
§ 107(1) (2012)).
161 See Salters v. Beam Suntory, Inc., No. 14-cv-659, 2015 WL 2124939 (N.D. Fla. May 1,
2015) (considering, and ultimately rejecting, a false advertising claim against Maker’s Mark
for calling its bourbon “handmade”); Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (Velasquez), 246
P.3d 877, 889 (Cal. 2011) (noting that “[t]o some consumers, processes . . . matter,” offering
examples of conflict-free diamonds and union-made goods); Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences
for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118
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To be clear, my argument in this section does not deal much with
trade secret law (or, for that matter, patent law). Consumers of tech-
nological goods like pharmaceuticals and smartphones probably don’t
care much about copy process. Most of us wouldn’t favor one generic
drug over another simply because its manufacturer had to work
harder to copy a branded version. We just want to know whether it
will work.162
Expressive goods, however, are another story. Audiences often
relate differently to recreations than they do to mechanical duplica-
tions. Start with one of the more notable recreations of the Renais-
sance, Andrea del Sarto’s replica of Raphael’s portrait of Pope Leo X.
According to the sixteenth-century art historian Giorgio Vasari, the
Duke of Mantua had been promised the original portrait as a gift, but
its Medici caretaker did not want to see it leave Florence.163 So the
enterprising caretaker had Andrea repaint it and pass off the copy as
the original.164 When the Duke received the gift, neither he nor even
Raphael’s disciple could tell it was a copy—Andrea had so expertly
copied the painting, right down to “the spots of dirt,” that no one
could tell the difference.165 But Vasari himself had seen Andrea in the
act of copying and blew the whistle, informing the Duke that he had
received a mere imitation.166 No matter. According to Vasari’s telling,
the Duke simply shrugged and announced:
I value it no less than if it were by the hand of [Raphael]—nay, even
more, for it is something out of the course of nature that a man of
excellence should imitate the manner of another so well, and should
HARV. L. REV. 525, 532 (2004) (“[C]onsumer products—even when physically
indistinguishable—are not perfect substitutes to the extent that they are produced using
different processes about which consumers have strong feelings.”); id. at 601–02
(“[C]onsumers are willing to pay a premium for goods derived from certain production
processes, even in the absence of appreciable differences in the resulting products. Among
other items, such preferences have been demonstrated for non-GM foods, sustainably
harvested timber, and fairly traded goods.”); cf. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116
(1941) (rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to the Fair Labor Standards Act and, along
with it, the once-accepted product/process distinction under which “Congressional power
to prohibit interstate commerce is limited to articles which in themselves have some
harmful or deleterious property”).
162 To be sure, consumers of new technologies may very well care about certain aspects
of the manufacturing process, such as fair trade or environmental sustainability. See
generally Kysar, supra note 161 But when comparing innovator and imitator, any
difference along those axes doesn’t present as clear a case for specialized IP treatment as
the difference between duplication and recreation does.
163 5 GIORGIO VASARI, LIVES OF THE MOST EMINENT PAINTERS, SCULPTORS, AND
ARCHITECTS 107 (Gaston du C. De Vere trans., AMS Press reprt. 1976) (1550).
164 Id. at 108.
165 Id.
166 Id.
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make a copy so like. It is enough that it should be known that
Andrea’s genius was as valiant in double harness as in single.167
Nearly five centuries later, fascination with recreations doesn’t
seem to have worn off. In 2012, a teenage boy spent months remaking
a Beyonce´ music video shot for shot, recreating every bit of choreog-
raphy, cinematography, and even the singer’s facial expressions.168 He
became a minor Internet celebrity.169 Millions of viewers flocked to
watch his video not so much because of the product itself, which
looked stunningly like the original (minus, of course, the identity of
the singer), so much as because of everything he did to bring it into
being.170 The replicated performance exemplifies just how difficult it
is to do certain things consciously that a predecessor has done uncon-
sciously: blinks, the slightest of smiles, momentary glances away. The
project is challenging (and therefore captivating) not just because of
resource constraints, but also because of the performer’s talent at
forcing previously random outcomes to reappear on command.
Likewise, when a group of fans spent years faithfully recreating
the film Raiders of the Lost Ark from scratch, their remake became a
cult classic, screening at the SXSW festival and inspiring a feature-
length documentary film about the creation process.171 Critics lauded
the group members for their skill in comprehensively replicating an
iconic Hollywood blockbuster “on a shoestring budget.”172 After
seeing the remake, director Quentin Tarantino commented that “they
167 Id. at 108–09.
168 See supra note 20.
169 See id.
170 See Jen Carlson, Meet Ton Do-Nguyen, the Snuggie “Countdown” Kid Beyonce´ Calls
“Brilliant,” GOTHAMIST (July 21, 2012, 10:22 AM), http://gothamist.com/2012/07/21/
we_talk_to_ton_do-nguyen_the_snuggi.php (praising the “incredibly talented teenager
reenacting Beyonce´’s ‘Countdown’ video in the most perfect way” and noting that “[h]e
nails every part of the fast-moving video—if you blink an eye you’ll miss a perfectly
synched up detail”); Mawuse Ziegbe, Beyonce Co-signs “Snuggie” Version of Her
“Countdown” Video, BOSTON.COM: POP RADAR (July 19, 2012, 2:48 PM), http://
www.boston.com/ae/celebrity/blog/popradar/2012/07/beyonce_co-signs_snuggie_version_
of_her_countdown_video.html (ascribing the video’s viral popularity largely to “the fairly
faithful recreation of the video’s elaborate choreography and pop-art style editing”).
171 SXSW SCHEDULE, Raiders of the Lost Ark: The Adaptation , http://
schedule.sxsw.com/2015/events/event_FS19208 (last visited Feb. 14, 2016); RAIDERS! THE
STORY OF THE GREATEST FAN FILM EVER MADE (Jeremy Coon Productions 2015).
172 See Jim Windolf, Raiders of the Lost Backyard, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 2004, at 254, 254;
Daniel Kreps, After 30 Years, ‘Raiders of the Lost Ark’ Devotees Finish Adaptation,
ROLLING STONE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/movies/videos/after-30-years-
raiders-of-the-lost-ark-devotees-finish-adaptation-20150304; Amy Nicholson, After 33
Years and an Airplane Explosion, Their Raiders of the Lost Ark Remake is Almost
Complete. Are They?, LA WEEKLY (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.laweekly.com/arts/after-33-
years-and-an-airplane-explosion-their-raiders-of-the-lost-ark-remake-is-almost-complete-
are-they-5205358.
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start bowling you over with their ingenuity. Because you know the
movie so well, you can’t wait for them to do the next scene. ‘How are
they going to do this? Well, they can’t do that!’ And then they come
up with a way to do it.”173 One reviewer noted that, compared to the
ones recreating the film, “Spielberg had it easy.”174 After all, “[h]e
had a studio budget and hundreds of helpers. More importantly, he
had creative freedom. If a shot wasn’t working, he could change it. If a
stunt failed, he could scrap it. By contrast, The Adaptation was mana-
cled to Spielberg’s caprice. . . . Mimicry can be even harder than the
original.”175
A similar fascination with recreating an expert’s achievement
underlies the recent documentary Tim’s Vermeer.176 The film chroni-
cles a novice’s efforts to recreate a Vermeer painting using the process
that, according to this hypothesis, the artist himself had once used. He
spent years on the project, including developing and building the
optical devices on which he believed Vermeer relied, building a full-
scale replica of the room that was the subject of the original painting,
mixing pigments, and finally a painstaking several months of putting
brush to canvas.177 As one film critic put it, the story captivates
because it centers on an individual “erect[ing] his own Everest and
then proceed[ing] to climb it.”178
Recreations needn’t be in the precise medium that the original
creator used. Sometimes expressive reasons exist to recreate in a dif-
ferent one. Take, for example, Jojakim Cortis and Adrian Sonder-
egger, who built detailed scale models replicating famous historical
photographs like the Hindenburg crash, the Loch Ness monster, and
the first moon landing.179 Over the course of days and sometimes
weeks, they used various physical materials, from tarps to sand to
173 Nicholson, supra note 172.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 TIM’S VERMEER (High Delft Pictures 2013).
177 See Kurt Andersen, Reverse-engineering a Genius (Has a Vermeer Mystery Been
Solved?), VANITY FAIR (Nov. 29, 2013, 2:03 PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/unchanged/
2013/11/vermeer-secret-tool-mirrors-lenses; Peter Debruge, Telluride Film Review: Tim’s
Vermeer, VARIETY (Sept. 2, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://variety.com/2013/film/markets-
festivals/telluride-film-review-tims-vermeer-1200596123; Joe Morgenstern, A Magical Tour
of “Vermeer” Mystery, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2014, 7:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052702303519404579351750724256752.
178 Debruge, supra note 177.
179 See Sheena McKenzie, 12 Famous Photos Painstakingly Recreated with Miniature
Models, CNN (Dec. 23, 2015, 9:22 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/27/world/historys-
most-famous-photos-recreated-miniature-models/; Zachary Slobig, History’s Most Iconic
Photos, Recreated in Miniature, WIRED (Mar. 9, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/
2015/03/jojakim-cortis-adrian-sonderegger-iconen/.
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cotton balls, to construct their recreations.180 It was arguably that
investment of labor that caught observers’ attention.181
These anecdotes might seem extreme, but they resonate with a
familiar form of consumer behavior. Over a century ago, Thorstein
Veblen observed that a hand-wrought silver spoon could be identical
to, and yet deemed far more valuable than, a machine-made one.182
There remains a similar premium on intensive creation processes
today. Many are willing to spend a little bit extra for a handmade
quilt. Or handmade furniture. Or handmade ceramics. Or pretty much
anything on the Etsy website.183 Think of it as a “handmade effect.”
According to a recent marketing study, consumers in Western coun-
tries perceive many handmade objects to be more attractive and are
willing to pay more for them even while holding product quality con-
stant.184 What’s more, the value of handmade process is robust
enough that this preference holds true even when dealing with an
unspecific, anonymous producer.185
A similar phenomenon may be at work in audience reception of
artistic work. Several controlled experiments have found that percep-
tions of the effort and skill involved in a creation process affect evalu-
ation of the resulting creation.186 Two deserve special mention. First,
psychology professors George Newman and Paul Bloom presented
participants with an original artwork and an identical duplicate,
180 See Slobig, supra note 173.
181 See sources cited supra note 179 (focusing on the difficulty of the recreation
process).
182 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 85–86 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2007) (1899).
183 See Rob Walker, Handmade 2.0, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 16, 2007), http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/12/16/magazine/16Crafts-t.html (describing Etsy’s capitalization on
“the appeal of the handmade to those who might not have the inclination to do the
making”).
184 See Christoph Fuchs et al., The Handmade Effect: What’s Love Got to Do with It?, 79
J. MKTG. 98, 107 (2015).
185 See id.
186 See, e.g., Justin Kruger et al., The Effort Heuristic, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 91, 92 (2004) (“[A]ll else being equal, people tend to believe that a painting that
takes 2 days to paint is better than one that takes 2 h[ours], just as people tend to believe
that an additional manuscript revision will result in a better paper.”); see also Hyejeung
Cho & Norbert Schwarz, Of Great Art and Untalented Artists: Effort Information and the
Flexible Construction of Judgmental Heuristics, 18 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 205, 208 (2008)
(replicating these results when participants were first asked to evaluate the quality of the
work, though not when they were first asked to evaluate the talent of its creator). Kruger
and his colleagues hypothesize that perceived effort is simply a heuristic for aesthetic
value, which is difficult to pin down. See Kruger, supra, at 92. One need not accept that
hypothesis—artisanal investment could be a real preference, after all, not just a heuristic—
in order to accept their underlying finding that observers treat laboriously-created art
better than physically-identical but less easily-created art.
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varying the accompanying information on whether the original or the
duplicate required significant effort to produce.187 They found that, as
a general matter, audiences tended to rank duplicates inferior to origi-
nals.188 Yet when a low amount of effort was required to create the
original and a high amount of effort was required to duplicate it, par-
ticipants rated the two artworks as equally valuable.189 Laboriously
produced duplicates took on special worth. The authors of the study
theorized that participants had judged both original and recreation to
be “the products of unique creative acts: one that resulted in the orig-
inal design and one that used an entirely new process to replicate that
design.”190 Even when dealing with copies, then, sequestering product
from process is easier said than done.
Second, Shyamkrishna Balganesh and colleagues have recently
explored the role of labor in the specific context of copyright infringe-
ment cases. In their experiment, telling lay jurors that the creator
expended significant labor to produce the original work at issue
increased the perceived similarity between that original and a non-
exact copy of it.191 The study designers conjecture that perhaps “the
creator’s expenditure of labor led subjects to view the copying
involved as entailing greater (and more morally outrageous) free-
riding, which they treated as wrongful.”192 The study sheds only lim-
ited light on copy process per se, as none of the experimental condi-
tions varied jurors’ information on the amount of labor that the
copyist expended in replicating the copyrighted work. Nevertheless,
the study still provides reason to suspect that Newman and Bloom’s
findings on the perceived aesthetic value of laborious recreations
could cash out in copyright trials.
Why might audiences value particular copy processes over
others? It may be that, at least in some contexts, the act of copying
acquires a different moral valence when the creator hasn’t had to
work much harder than the copyist, as Balganesh and colleagues sug-
gest.193 That intuition would track the economic imitation costs argu-
ment outlined in the previous section, and it’s consistent with
precedent that emphasizes the perceived morality of the defendant’s
187 See Newman & Bloom, supra note 151, at 564–65.
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 Id. at 565.
191 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Essay, Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267,
282–84 (2014).
192 Id. at 288.
193 See id.
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methods.194 It may also be that, as Newman and Bloom posit, difficult
acts of copying impress audiences in ways similar to difficult acts of
creating in the first instance.195 Newman and Bloom ground their
hypothesis in aesthetic theories claiming that audiences experience
expressive goods, even static objects like paintings, as conclusions of
their creators’ performances.196 Change the performance and you nec-
essarily change the product. From this perspective, the copy process is
a performance all its own. Labor-intensive recreations are capstones
to performances that audiences care about; mechanical duplications
aren’t. Obviously, there remains value in the work being reproduced
separate and apart from the means of reproduction—few of us would
prefer to convene a new cast and crew of Raiders of the Lost Ark
every time we want to watch it. But effective recreations can bring
pleasure to audiences even on top of the content that is recreated.
The idea that the means of reproduction casts a shadow over aes-
thetic objects harkens back at least as far as Walter Benjamin’s 1936
essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.197
Benjamin argued that increasingly widespread technological repro-
duction was extinguishing an original copy’s “aura” of authenticity.198
“[A] work of art has always been reproducible,” Benjamin wrote, but
“[m]echanical reproduction of a work of art . . . represents something
new.”199 When a work is copied quickly and pervasively, it loses its
authority as a unique artifact, leaving little difference between any
given copy and another.200
As Barton Beebe has recently emphasized, though, Benjamin
overlooked the fact that “in producing ever more copies, ‘mechanical
194 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562–63 (1985)
(invoking “the propriety of the defendant’s conduct” to reject a fair use argument where
the defendant had “knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript”).
195 See Newman & Bloom, supra note 151, at 565.
196 See id. at 559 (citing theorists). Among the theorists cited is Denis Dutton, who has
argued that all works of art are artifacts of their creation histories: “If we see an actor or a
dancer or a violinist at work, we are constantly conscious of human agency. Less
immediately apparent is the element of performance in a painting . . . . Yet we are no less
in such cases confronted with the results of human agency.” Denis Dutton, Artistic Crimes,
19 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 302, 305 (1979); see also Kendall L. Walton, Style and the Products
and Processes of Art, in THE CONCEPT OF STYLE 80 (Berel Lang ed., Cornell Univ. Press
rev. ed. 1987) (“[T]he notion of the style of a work of art is to be understood somehow in
terms of the notion of the manner in which it was made. . . . [W]e ‘see’ in a work the action
of producing it . . . .”).
197 Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS 217 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., Schocken Books 1968)
(1955).
198 See id. at 221.
199 Id.
200 See id.
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reproduction’ only amplifies all the more the distinctive ‘aura’ of
those things that are perceived not as mechanically reproduced copies,
but rather as authentic originals.”201 Beebe’s observation can be
extended even further: Mechanical reproduction amplifies not just
what is perceived to be an authentic original, but also what is per-
ceived to be an authentic recreation.202 In an age of mechanical repro-
duction, non-mechanical reproduction takes on heightened aesthetic,
and even political, significance. Advancing technologies like 3-D
printing and robotics are making more and more resources less and
less scarce.203 As today’s burgeoning craft movement reflects, human
involvement may be one of the few scarce things remaining.204 There’s
a growing “revenge of analog.”205 The rarity of hands-on production
processes creates value that can inure in recreations just as much as it
can in the originals on which they’re based.
All of this matters for copyright law for two reasons. First, as a
descriptive matter, it may help explain why some courts invoke the
defendant’s labor even without a doctrinal basis.206 The labor involved
in creating and copying seems to matter to laypeople.207 It seems to
matter to potential copyright jurors.208 And so it probably matters to
judges, too. Beyond the infringement cases discussed in Part I, there
are glimpses of this attitude in the handful of decisions addressing
whether authorized replications of artwork merit their own copy-
201 Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 809, 868 (2010).
202 See WINNIE WON YIN WONG, VAN GOGH ON DEMAND: CHINA AND THE
READYMADE 16 (2013) (“In the culture of the ubiquitous copy . . . it is the manual
technology of reproduction—that is, hand-copied painting—that has been reinvested with
a certain, though now paradoxical, authenticity.”).
203 See generally Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
460 (2015) (contemplating the effects of technological innovations on scarcity and IP law).
204 See FAYTHE LEVINE & CORTNEY HEIMERL, HANDMADE NATION: THE RISE OF
DIY, ART, CRAFT, AND DESIGN 44 (2008) (“Because each item is unique and handmade, it
goes against the grain of mass manufactured products”); Walker, supra note 183, at 78
(quoting the “Handmade Pledge,” endorsed by Etsy, stating that “[o]ur ties to the local
and human sources of our goods have been lost . . . . Buying handmade helps us
reconnect”). As one Etsy consumer wrote in a blog post, “the older I got, the more I felt
drawn to things made by hand . . . . I want a connection to a person who has put a bit of
herself into the creation of [the object].” Imagineannie, The Etsy Girl, FOREST STREET
KITCHEN (June 22, 2012), https://imagineannie.wordpress.com/2012/06/22/the-etsy-girl/.
205 David Sax, Why Startups Love Moleskines, NEW YORKER (June 14, 2015), http://
www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-startups-love-moleskines.
206 See supra notes 47–124 and accompanying text (discussing judicial opinions
emphasizing the defendant’s labor).
207 See Newman & Bloom, supra note 151 (finding that perceived labor can affect
perceived value).
208 See Balganesh et al., supra note 191, at 284 (finding that perceived labor can affect
perceived similarity in simulated copyright cases).
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rights. In one case, for instance, a court held that a reduced-size ren-
dering of a Rodin sculpture was copyrightable because the reduction
“requires far more than an abridgement of a written classic; great skill
and originality is called for when one seeks to produce a scale reduc-
tion of a great work with exactitude.”209 In a subsequent case, a court
denied copyrightability to a plastic replica of a public-domain toy
bank, distinguishing the Rodin case based on the “true artistic skill”
and “complexity and exactitude” involved in that reproduction pro-
cess.210 There’s good reason to think that judges can be similarly
impressed by complexity and exactitude on the defendant’s side of the
“v.,” too. Infringement policy would at least be more transparent if we
acknowledged that the copy process may already be influencing legal
decision-makers, even if only at the margins.
Second, as a normative matter, black-letter doctrine’s inhibition
of recreations inflicts a social cost that the standard analysis doesn’t
normally reflect. The most-recognized static cost of copyright limita-
tions on unauthorized reproductions is the deadweight loss from
supracompetitive pricing. Recreations pose a separate problem.
There, copyright liability is not so much increasing prices for the same
good as suppressing a qualitatively different good. We have remakes
of Raiders and Beyonce´ music videos only at the sufferance of copy-
right owners.211 Unlike garden-variety derivative works such as a
cinema adaptation of a novel, recreations lose expressive force if per-
formed by the original work’s author. Audiences rally around one who
recreates a Vermeer precisely because he is not Vermeer. And under
fair use principles, the inability of a copyright holder to enter a partic-
ular market is a good reason for letting others do so.212
Relying on licensing isn’t a very attractive solution either. To
begin with, it’s an open question how often creators would actually
permit others to share the limelight. Though recreations can be loving
tributes, they can also diminish the luster of romantic genius that
sometimes surrounds the original.213 Yet even if licenses were readily
209 Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
210 See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491–92 (2d Cir. 1976).
211 See Windolf, supra note 172, at 264 (describing the Raiders adaptation creators’
“fantasy” that “Spielberg would one day see the movie they were making—and . . . would
congratulate them, rather than sue,” a fantasy that ended up coming true).
212 See, e.g., Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 560
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (observing that fair use is more likely to be found “when the use . . . takes
place in a market that the copyright holder is unlikely to develop,” such as the market for
parodies, reviews, or news analyses) (quoting Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd.,
996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993)).
213 See, e.g., Debruge, supra note 177 (“[W]hat if someone told you that anybody could
paint as well as Vermeer? Is it still a masterpiece if an amateur could do it?”).
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available, it would be perverse to require them in instances where imi-
tation costs are already high. Moreover, while ubiquitous forms of
copying like online photo embedding have nudged copyright owners
into offering blanket licenses, there’s as of yet no voluntary blanket
license for recreations,214 and there’s not likely to be one any time
soon. Directly negotiating one-off deals, with its inevitable transaction
costs, would be the only realistic choice. If licensing fees and transac-
tion costs are stacked on top of the natural expense of recreating from
scratch, some recreations simply won’t get made. That market failure
seems an unnecessary price to pay if recreators pose little threat to
copyright owners as it is—doubly so if they aren’t even seeking to
compete with owners commercially.215
So long as authors of original works remain able to keep
authoring, subsidizing recreations is a socially worthy end. As recent
case law has emphasized, owners “cannot prevent others from
entering fair use markets” merely through eagerness to license.216
Whether offering copyright protection is the best way to enrich
society, not just whether owners would license, should guide the
analysis.217
Foregone recreations are one way that infringement liability
could leave the public worse off. The next section introduces another.
C. Learning by Doing
The most valuable copy processes yield more than just a copied
product. They also yield skills for creating new products.
In 1916, philosopher and educational reformer John Dewey intro-
duced the pedagogical theory that we today associate with experien-
tial learning.218 Dewey explained that “[t]he knowledge which comes
214 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, All of This Has Happened Before and All of This
Will Happen Again: Innovation in Copyright Licensing, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1447
(2014) (describing the increasing frequency, but persistent flaws, of copyright licensing for
noncommercial or formerly noncommercial uses).
215 See supra Section II.A (discussing the relationship between imitation costs and
copyright incentives).
216 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006);
see also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1357 n.19 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
(“[T]o measure the detriment to plaintiff by loss of presumed royalty income . . . assume[s]
at the start the merit of the plaintiff’s position . . . .”), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420
U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam).
217 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use Markets: On Weighing Potential License Fees, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1814, 1842 (2011) (“When circumstances give us no reason to trust
that the market that the Copyright Act enabled will serve social goals, or if there is
affirmative reason to trust nonmarket modes of circulation and productivity to do a better
job, then those factors should help persuade toward fair use.”).
218 JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 217 (1916).
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first to persons, and that remains most deeply ingrained, is knowledge
of how to do; how to walk, talk, read, write, skate, ride a bicycle,
manage a machine, calculate, drive a horse, sell goods, manage
people, and so on indefinitely.”219 “[T]he natural course of develop-
ment,” he claimed, “always sets out with situations which involve
learning by doing.”220 By the 1960s, the core insight of learning by
doing had begun to influence the literature on innovation economics.
Kenneth Arrow famously theorized in The Economic Implications of
Learning by Doing that the act of production itself fosters solutions to
new problems.221 Producing old things benefits society as the pro-
ducers obtain more knowledge and, often enough, start to produce
new things.
As John Duffy recently argued, this knowledge spillover gives
“the productive activity itself . . . a theoretical claim to favorable regu-
latory treatment similar to the claim for favoring investment in
research.”222 In Duffy’s framework, favorable treatment comes in the
form of granting greater rights to patentees who have successfully
practiced their inventions compared to patentees who have merely
conceived them on paper.223 The underlying theory, though, can be
extended further. It needn’t depend on whether the object being pro-
duced happens to be the producer’s own creation or instead someone
else’s. The production process itself carries the potential to incubate
know-how all the same. Learning by copying is just a form of learning
by doing. Ideally, then, production would receive some form of sub-
sidy even when the product is a reproduction.
Copying an expert’s work, as many art school students know, is a
great way to learn the tricks of the trade.224 Individuals with experi-
ence copying art often speak of the greater understanding of the orig-
inal that the activity affords them. One expert copyist got his start
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, 29 REV. ECON.
STUD. 155, 156 (1962) (“[T]echnical change in general can be ascribed to experience, that it
is the very activity of production which gives rise to problems for which favorable
responses are selected over time.”).
222 John F. Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1394
(2013).
223 See id. at 1374, 1396–97.
224 See Jonathan Jones, Why Would-be Artists Should Imitate the Greats, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 19, 2009, 07:01 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2009/sep/19/
aspiring-artists-should-imitate-masters (highlighting the benefits that accrue to aspiring
artists from copying the masters); Malcolm Jones, There’s Nothing Wrong—and a Lot
That’s Right—About Copying Other Artists, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 26, 2014, 06:45 AM), http:/
/www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/26/there-s-nothing-wrong-and-a-lot-that-s-right-
about-copying-other-artists.html (describing historical tradition and personal practice of
learning to paint by copying).
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while lecturing on painting technique at London’s National Gallery,
after deciding to copy the subjects of his lectures in order to figure
out, in his words, “how do they do that?”225 Another remarked that
“[o]ne of the reasons I do what I do is to absorb what the painters
were getting at.”226
This attitude goes back a long way. In 1755, German art historian
Johann Winckelmann notably asserted that “[t]he only way for us to
become great, and indeed—if this possible—inimitable, is by imitating
the ancients.”227 The Louvre has throughout its history encouraged
painters to train by copying masterworks in its collection.228 Degas, a
Louvre copyist himself, is reputed to have said “[y]ou have to copy
and recopy the masters . . . and it’s only after having proved oneself as
a good copyist that you can reasonably try to do a still life of a
radish.”229 New York City’s Metropolitan Museum of Art has offered
a “Copyist Program” since 1872, intended to “celebrate[ ] intensive
technical study, problem solving, and dialogue with artists and
artworks of the past.”230 The National Gallery of Art has offered one
since 1941.231 One might think that such educational programs’ exis-
tence demonstrates that copyright law is doing fine even without
adding copy process to the mix. Yet even they must operate in the
shadow of copyright liability. Museums frequently limit participants to
repainting public domain or permanent collection works within their
control.232
225 Iain Gale, Never Say ‘Fake’. Forget ‘Forgery’. It’s Got to Be ‘Copy’ or ‘Pastiche,’
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 4, 1995), http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/never-
say-fake-forget-forgery-its-got-to-be-copy-or-pastiche-1599527.html.
226 Id.
227 Johann Winckelmann, Thoughts on the Imitation of the Painting and Sculpture of the
Greeks, in GERMAN AESTHETIC AND LITERARY CRITICISM: WINCKELMANN, LESSING,
HAMANN, HERDER, SCHILLER, GOETHE 33 (H.B. Nisbet ed. & trans. 1985).
228 Joseph A. Harriss, Master Class, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 2001), http://
www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/master-class-69130767/ (tracing the encouragement
of copying at the Louvre to its opening two centuries ago).
229 Id.
230 Copyist Program, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/events/
programs/art-making-programs/copyist-program (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
231 Copyist Program, NAT’L GALLERY OF ART, http://www.nga.gov/content/ngaweb/
visit/copyist.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
232 See, e.g., Visiting FAQ and Announcements, CLEVELAND MUSEUM OF ART, http://
www.clevelandart.org/visit/visitor-information/visiting-faq-and-announcements (last visited
Feb. 19, 2016) (“It is prohibited to copy works of art on loan to the museum and works of
art restricted by copyright.”); Tips for Visiting the Frye, FRYE ART MUSEUM, http://
fryemuseum.org/tips/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2016) (“It is prohibited to copy works of art on
loan to the Frye Art Museum and works of art restricted by copyright.”); Tips for Visitors,
MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS BOS., http://www.mfa.org/visit/plan-your-visit/tips-visitors (last
visited Feb. 19, 2016) (“Only paintings owned by the MFA may be copied.”).
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Learning by copying isn’t just limited to painting and sculpture.
Architecture students at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris honed
their craft by trying to imitate the great structures of antiquity and the
Italian Renaissance.233 Jazz musicians learn how to improvise by repli-
cating famous solos.234 Trumpeter Art Farmer, for instance, once
reflected that transcribing others’ solos early on taught him what
sounded good and what didn’t, “like getting your vocabulary
straight.”235 Recreating entire tracks in the studio teaches music pro-
ducers how to build a hit record.236 To the same end, the musicology
program in which I studied as an undergraduate devoted the first sev-
eral semesters to mimicking the compositional style of classical greats,
first Bach, then Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven. Bach himself
arranged others’ works in his youth as a learning aid.237
In this respect, the arts are a lot like engineering. Automotive
manufacturers routinely disassemble each other’s latest models in an
effort to discern the choices that competitors make and why they
make them.238 “As much as you think you know,” one industry ana-
lyst explained, “nothing beats picking up the parts, feeling them,
weighing them, and knowing the processes that made them.”239 Over
the last two decades, dissection and reverse engineering have become
more important in undergraduate engineering curricula.240
233 See Raleigh W. Newsam, II, Architecture and Copyright—Separating the Poetic from
the Prosaic, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1073, 1098 (1997) (noting that the Beaux-Arts system derived
universal architectural principles from study and imitation of the past).
234 See PAUL F. BERLINER, THINKING IN JAZZ: THE INFINITE ART OF IMPROVISATION
95–97 (1994) (describing various ways in which, “[j]ust as children learn to speak their
native language by imitating older competent speakers, so young musicians learn to
speak jazz by imitating seasoned improvisers”).
235 Id. at 95.
236 See JOHN SEABROOK, THE SONG MACHINE: INSIDE THE HIT FACTORY 59 (2015)
(recounting how Clive Calder and Mutt Lange’s early experience of “taking hit songs
apart, figuring out how they worked, and putting them back together again . . . gave both
men a keen appreciation for what went into making a hit, knowledge that served them
both very well later on”).
237 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing,
Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 610 (2006).
238 See Carl Hoffman, The Teardown Artists, WIRED (Feb. 1, 2006, 12:00 PM), http://
www.wired.com/2006/02/teardown/.
239 Id.
240 See Katie Grantham et al., A Study on Situated Cognition: Product Dissection’s
Effect on Redesign Activities, ADVANCES IN ENGINEERING EDUC., Summer 2013, at 2
(describing adoption of product dissection in academic settings and noting that it has been
found to: (1) increase awareness of the design process; (2) encourage the development of
curiosity, proficiency, and manual dexterity; (3) give students early exposure to fully
operational and functional products and processes; as well as (4) increase motivation and
retention (footnotes omitted)).
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Picking up on this pedagogical theme, some copyright scholars
have tried to conceptualize copying as a stepping-stone to origi-
nality.241 If copyright is meant to promote creativity, the argument
goes, then it may be shooting itself in the foot by controlling down-
stream users’ ability to copy from others. Yet extending the learning-
by-doing insight from IP owners’ conduct to potential infringers’ con-
duct is tricky. It seems to prove too much. As Jane Ginsburg has
observed, activities that copyright law brands infringing might enable
subsequent creation, but “the same might be said of everything, from
works of authorship to cups of coffee, that becomes an input in a pro-
spective author’s creative process.”242 Before the idea of learning by
copying can be operationalized, it needs a limiting principle.
The copy process supplies one. Some processes are simply more
likely to cultivate expertise in the field than others. Repainting a
painting is not the same as scanning it. Restaging a photograph is not
the same as photocopying it. Rerecording a track of music is not the
same as cutting and pasting it. For each, the former engages more
deeply than the latter with the content of the copied work, looking
underneath the hood to see how it works. Generally speaking, the act
of retracing a predecessor’s creative steps sows more know-how about
the work than does the act of duplicating the work through a key-
stroke or two.
If copyright doctrine could differentiate between the processes
through which a copy is produced, it could select for those activities
that are most apt to underwrite future creativity. That kind of sorting
isn’t unprecedented. Indeed, it is precisely what trade secret law does
already. Trade secrecy’s improper means doctrine, discussed above,243
attempts to separate what one court has called the “inventive” copy
processes from the “sterile wealth redistributive—not productive”
ones.244 Case law shows special solicitude for reverse engineering
241 See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes
Better than Hedgehogs, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785, 851 (2013) (“By copying a
master’s work, the ‘pupil’ might at least get a glimpse of the great author’s mind, which
would seem like a normatively desirable process.”); Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly
Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 646 (2006) (“In copying technique, one learns
technique; in copying style, one learns style. If the copyist is lucky, he finds his own style in
the end, but even if he does not, his mastery of technique makes him capable of creating
beauty.”).
242 Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1383, 1390 (2014).
243 See supra text accompanying notes 59–63.
244 Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991); see
supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Gerard N. Magliocca, Ornamental Design
and Incremental Innovation, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 883–84 (2003) (arguing that trade
secret law sets a good model for the protection of industrial design because “the focus
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largely because of its dynamic benefits for skill development and
incremental innovation.245 Were copyright doctrine to feature a sim-
ilar policy lever, it could carve out some space for educative copying
without needing to throw up its hands and declare all copying fair
game.
D. Administrative Costs
The previous three sections introduced the benefits of empow-
ering courts to discriminate among copy processes. But, as usual,
there’s a catch. Judging a product on its face is simpler than trying to
piece through testimony or paper trails concerning production
methods.246 Both the potential plaintiffs monitoring possible infringe-
ment and the courts that ultimately adjudicate any disputes would
have an easier time if process is kept out of the picture entirely.
Anxiety over administration costs has long appeared in debates
over whether infringement should require copying to begin with, the
first question of process sensitivity.247 Defenders of patent liability’s
conflation of imitative and independent development often point to
the heavy cost of correctly distinguishing one from the other. As early
as 1837, for example, a patent treatise contended, “it is a matter of too
much difficulty and intricacy of proof, to distinguish the cases of
others who have made the same invention without any assistance from
his ingenuity, from those of mere imitations. The law, in order to be
practicable and convenient to be administered, must give the exclusive
should be on channeling would-be copiers into conducting independent research rather
than allowing them to engage in relatively unproductive activities such as industrial
espionage or copying simpliciter”).
245 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989).
246 See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683,
705–08 (2003) (discussing the evidentiary difficulty of determining the creation process of
outwardly similar works); Roin, supra note 57, at 705 (noting the challenges that the
government faces in obtaining information on firms’ imitation costs). This concern over
unobservable history evokes the concept of “historicity” that Philip K. Dick explored in his
1962 novel, The Man in the High Castle. At one point, an antiquities specialist holds up two
outwardly identical objects, one that had belonged to President Roosevelt and one that
hadn’t. The character observes: “One has historicity, a hell of a lot of it. As much as any
object ever had. And one has nothing. Can you feel it? . . . You can’t. You can’t tell which
is which. There’s no ‘mystical plasmic presence,’ no ‘aura’ around it.” PHILIP K. DICK, THE
MAN IN THE HIGH CASTLE 63–64 (Vintage Books ed. 1992). I thank Matthew Sag for the
reference.
247 See supra text accompanying notes 16–18 (discussing debates over whether patent
law should join copyright and trade secrecy laws in making copying an element of liability).
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right.”248 That same concern continues in today’s patent policy
discussions.249
Copyright is spared a similar fate because of the relative infre-
quency with which separate authors independently create substan-
tially similar expression.250 But were the copyright infringement test
to ask not just whether but also how copying was done, it would invite
a different challenge. By definition, anyone asserting a “proper
means” defense would concede an act of copying. The court would
then need to determine whether the manner of the copying excuses it.
Sorting among copyists would cost private monitoring resources for
copyright owners considering whether to go to court and public adju-
dicative resources once they got there. The “Hope Poster” copyright
litigation,251 with its protracted back and forth over whether the
defendant used a series of simple Adobe Photoshop edits or instead a
more labor-intensive method, offers a glimpse at the work courts
might need to do if improper means became an infringement factor.252
Nevertheless, there’s good reason to expect that such sorting
wouldn’t significantly tax the copyright system if it became part of the
law. First of all, the current Copyright Act has already successfully
followed a similarly process-sensitive model in administering protec-
tion of sound recordings. Section 114(b) of the Act provides that the
reproduction right for sound recordings is limited to “directly or indi-
rectly recaptur[ing] the actual sounds fixed in the recording,”
expressly excluding “the making or duplication of another sound
recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other
sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the
248 WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 6 (1837), quoted in
Liivak, supra note 17, at 1675.
249 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86
TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) (“An independent-invention defense would also present difficult
administrative problems because courts would have a difficult time distinguishing between
true and false claims of duplication.”); Richard A. Posner, Essay, Misappropriation: A
Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 626 (2003) (arguing that patent law’s lack of an independent-
invention defense is cost-justified because of “the difficulty of determining independent
discovery by the methods of litigation and the resulting likelihood that the courts would
commit many errors in adjudicating patent infringement claims in cases in which
independent discovery was the defense”).
250 See Duffy, supra note 249, at 9 (explaining that copyright can afford an independent
creation defense because “in the copyright area, claims of true independent duplication are
much more rare”); Lichtman, supra  note 246, at 705 (“An originality
requirement . . . empowers courts to exclude from the copyright system a particularly
messy class of cases: cases in which courts would not be able to use similarity as the basis
for even a weak inference regarding the likelihood of impermissible copying.”).
251 Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 1:09CV-01123 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 9, 2009).
252 See supra text accompanying notes 87–92.
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copyrighted sound recording.”253 In other words, the statute distin-
guishes between a digital reproduction and a recreation from scratch,
even if the two sound identical. That process discrimination has
worked without much fuss since Congress instituted it in 1971.254
Courts’ successful history administering this particular section of the
Copyright Act suggests that they could employ process discrimination
more broadly.
Moreover, one must consider the baseline against which any such
change would be measured. In order to rule on a fair use defense, a
court must already consider a host of contextual factors. Why did the
copyist copy?255 What value did it add to the copied material?256 How
significant—both quantitatively and, more opaquely, qualitatively—
was the material that the copyist used?257 How would a reasonable
observer evaluate the resulting work?258 In order to answer these
existing questions properly, courts need to look at more than just the
works themselves. They need to peer behind the curtain and look at
the defendant’s background and goals, relevant market customs, and
audience expectations. The marginal burden of asking courts to look
at copy process alongside these other matters should be manageable.
The same evidence that establishes why the defendant copied may in
many cases establish how the defendant copied. On top of that, where
copyists have expressive reasons for adopting a particular process,
proof of that process will often be readily available. Indeed, in many
253 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012). Musical compositions, unlike sound recordings, are
subject to a separate copyright that can be infringed even through recreation.
254 See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, 391 (formerly codified as
17 U.S.C. § 1(f), the predecessor provision to today’s § 114(b)).
255 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012) (requiring courts to consider “the purpose and
character of the use”); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding fair use
where the defendant’s purposes in using the owner’s image were “sharply different” from
the owner’s goals in creating it).
256 See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251–52 (finding fair use more likely if “the secondary use
adds value to the original—if copyrightable expression in the original work is used as raw
material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings”).
257 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (requiring courts to consider “the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”); Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994) (concluding that the fair use test requires courts
to devote “thought not only about the quantity of the materials used, but about their
quality and importance”); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
569 (1985) (reversing lower court’s finding of fair use, notwithstanding the defendant’s
quantitatively small excerpt, because the court had “accorded too little weight to the
qualitative importance of the quoted passages of original expression”).
258 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that courts weighing
defenses of transformative fair use must “examine how the artworks may reasonably be
perceived”).
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of the cases reviewed in this Article, the copyists deliberately dis-
closed that evidence to the public.
Concerns about proof could be further addressed through burden
shifting. Placing the burden of production on the defendant is some-
times offered as a possibility for patent law under a proposed indepen-
dent invention regime. Judge Learned Hand, for example, made the
suggestion while testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights in 1956.259 Recognizing the pos-
sibility that patentees would struggle to prove that an accused
infringer had copied rather than developed the same invention inde-
pendently, Judge Hand proposed that “[i]f the patentee brought the
infringer to court and showed the infringer was making the same
thing, you might throw the burden on the supposed infringer to show
that he did not have to have recourse to the patent in order to do what
he did.”260
Whatever logistical complexity might have been involved in
implementing Judge Hand’s proposal, placing the burden on copyright
defendants to show their copy processes would be far simpler. Unlike
Judge Hand’s scenario, which requires evidence of a negative (namely,
the absence of copying), recreators’ burden would be the cleaner task
of proving that they copied in a particular manner. Using a certain
copy process lends itself to contemporaneous documentation more
easily than does developing a product independently of a predecessor
whose existence is not yet known. Defendants alleging a permissible
copy process would usually be the least-cost bearers of that burden.
Unsurprisingly, then, some courts in trade secret cases place the
burden of production on the defendant whenever it asserts that it
derived the plaintiff’s secret information through proper means.261
Courts in copyright cases could do something similar.
Of course, minimizing the cost of figuring out what the defendant
did doesn’t address a separate but substantial question for many copy-
right owners and downstream users: legal uncertainty. Even if proving
historical facts can be done at manageable expense, the legal signifi-
cance of those facts might still be up for grabs unless clear ex ante
boundaries are drawn. As the familiar rules versus standards debate
259 American Patent System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 114–15 (1956) (statement of
Learned Hand, Retired Judge).
260 Id. at 114.
261 See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1240 (8th
Cir. 1994); Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 400, 406
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated on other grounds, 559 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009); Integrated Cash
Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Dig. Transactions, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 370, 377–78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Combs & Assocs. v. Kennedy, 555 S.E.2d 634, 639 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
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teaches, however, such clarity must be traded off against flexibility.262
As I argue in Part III, harnessing the flexible fair use doctrine as copy-
right’s vehicle for applying an improper means doctrine has much to
commend it—both because of the large diversity of possible dispute
scenarios and also because no new legislation would be needed. But if
the law were to go the fair use route, one might fairly wonder if it
would ultimately shortchange downstream users by making the fair
use inquiry that much more complicated.263 Indeed, any suggestion of
broadening the range of information that’s fair game for fair use tends
to bring out similar objections.264
My answer is threefold. First, the uncertainty objection is more a
generic critique of the fair use system we already have, not of the
improper means inquiry in particular.265 Fair use famously eschews
bright-line rules.266 Instead, it calls for a balancing of factors under an
“equitable rule of reason analysis.”267 Consequently, the marginal
layer of complexity that considering copy process would add to
existing fair use doctrine is minimal.268 Second, as additional inquiries
go, the copy process is at least a reasonably straightforward one for
downstream users to grasp. Those users have the best information on
how they actually copy. That private information stands copy process
in stark contrast to other fair use inquiries that require knowledge of
the copyright owner’s market or of an audience’s likely response to a
work.269 Those factors require much more predictive guesswork than
copy process would.
262 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
263 See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 476
(2002) (“As a general matter, we prefer to have clear entitlements, since clarity reduces
both the potential for, and the cost of, disputes.”).
264 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003)
(noting the criticism that “[t]hat’s all we need—another dial on the fair use control panel”
in response to a proposed additional fair use factor).
265 See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 129, at 1496 (arguing that the
application of existing fair use doctrine has become too unpredictable).
266 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (cautioning that
the fair use test “is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis”).
267 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984).
268 Cf. Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L.
REV. 41, 85 (2007) (contending that adding a fifth “attribution” factor wouldn’t make fair
use more “fuzzy” than it already is and would “focus [courts’] attention on this important
matter, but at the same time would not bind them”); Liu, supra note 263, at 476 (arguing
that considering time as an additional factor “would in fact add little appreciable
uncertainty beyond the levels that already exist in copyright law more generally”).
269 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1), (4) (2012) (instructing courts to consider whether the use is of
a commercial or nonprofit nature, and the effect of the use on the potential market);
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013) (examining how the defendant’s work
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, if some cases are already
smuggling in process considerations as it is, recognizing copy process
would make the fair use calculus more—not less—transparent. As
I’ve argued above, both experimental evidence and occasional judicial
rhetoric suggest that a copyist’s labor can influence decision-makers’
evaluation of the copy.270 If that’s right, then the best way forward
would be to bring that consideration out into the open, where it can
be better understood.271 Despite the additional complexity that an
expanded analysis would bring, it may ultimately make outcomes
easier to follow and predict.
III
INTRODUCING IMPROPER MEANS TO COPYRIGHT LAW
Although copyright doctrine doesn’t currently consider the
defendant’s process, nothing in the Copyright Act requires this status
quo. There are two conceivable mechanisms through which courts
could weigh process in the infringement analysis: (1) as an element of
the plaintiff’s prima facie case or (2) as a factor in the fair use defense.
While both are theoretically possible, the fair use option is the more
realistically attainable.
Altering the prima facie case would be an analytically sound—
but extremely ambitious—approach. Under such a regime, the plain-
tiff would need to prove that the defendant’s process of copying was
improper, just as the plaintiff currently needs to prove that the defen-
dant’s amount of copying was improper. In each case, courts would
equitably determine whether the copy process at issue could support
an infringement claim.
To implement such a proposal, one first needs to address the stat-
utory text. The Copyright Act grants the owner a seemingly expansive
right to “reproduce the copyrighted work in copies,”272 appearing to
encompass all conceivable means of copying. But more is up for grabs
in the reproduction right than meets the eye. As one court noted in
interpreting the exclusive right to “copy” under the previous version
of the statute, “Read with blinders, this language might seem on its
“may reasonably be perceived”); see also Hughes, supra note 264, at 798 (making similar
argument with respect to downstream users’ knowledge of how much of the work’s
copyright term has so far elapsed); Liu, supra note 263, at 476–77 (same).
270 See supra Sections I.B, II.B.
271 Cf. Balganesh et al., supra note 191, at 288 (observing that if juries care about the
original creator’s labor even when copyright law doesn’t, “the law could embrace the
reality that moral intuitions relating to labor and free-riding directly influence the
assessment of similarity, which in turn serves as a simple proxy for wrongfulness”).
272 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012).
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surface to be all-comprehensive . . . but . . . ‘copy’ is not to be taken in
its full literal sweep.”273 By way of example, the court conjectured that
copying out a text by hand or with a typewriter may be distinguishable
from photocopying it.274 Though that distinction has never taken hold,
it nevertheless reflects the Supreme Court’s maxim that “[n]ot all cop-
ying . . . is copyright infringement.”275
Judicial decisions have regularly innovated infringement doc-
trines without much statutory guidance.276 Take, for example, the bed-
rock copyright rule that independent creation is a complete defense,
which dates back well into the nineteenth century.277 Allowing
independent creation is, I have argued, IP infringement policy’s most
basic form of sensitivity to process.278 That sensitivity began in the
courts, not in the legislature. Before the current Copyright Act was
enacted in 1976, predecessor versions of the reproduction right did not
just speak of a right against copying. They spoke also of rights against
“printing” and “publishing,” terms that appear to cover independently
created material just as much as copied material.279 In fact, when a
Second Circuit panel in Hein v. Harris actually engaged with the 1870
Act’s language of “printing, publishing, and vending,” it held that the
273 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (quoting
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075), aff’d by an equally divided court, 420
U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam).
274 See id.
275 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); see also Stillman
v. Leo Burnett Co., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“[A] defendant who has
copied from a plaintiff’s work as a factual matter . . . may not have copied as a legal
matter . . . .”).
276 See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 40 (1966) (“[T]he
[1909] statute, like its predecessors, leaves the development of fundamentals to the
judges. . . . [T]he courts have had to be consulted at nearly every point . . . .”).
277 See, e.g., Reed v. Carusi, 20 F. Cas. 431 (C.C.D. Md. 1845) (No. 11,642) (stating that
the defendant was allowed to produce “the same” musical composition as the plaintiff if “it
was not taken from [the plaintiff], but was the effort of his own mind, or taken from an air
composed by some other person, who was not a plagiarist from [the plaintiff]”); Emerson
v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 624 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (concluding that courts in
infringement actions should ask whether the defendant’s work is “a servile or evasive
imitation of the plaintiff’s work, or a bona fide original compilation from other common or
independent sources”). William Patry, author of an influential copyright treatise, dates the
independent creation defense as far back as the English case of Roworth v. Wilkes (1807) 1
Campbell 94, 98–99. WILLIAM F. PATRY, 3 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:32 n.1 (2015).
278 See supra Part I (identifying whether to provide an independent creation defense as
IP’s “first question of process sensitivity”).
279 See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(a), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (granting owners
the exclusive right to “print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work”);
Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (granting authors of protected works
“the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing,
finishing, and vending the same”). The presence of actions besides “copying” in the
statutory list arguably suggests that even independent creation could trigger liability.
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statute precluded an independent creation defense, contrary to the
weight of common-law authority.280 That decision, along with its lit-
eral reading of the statute’s phraseology of exclusive rights, was the
exception that proved the rule. Elsewhere and even within the same
circuit, other decisions agreed that copyright, in Judge Learned
Hand’s words, “imposes no prohibition upon those who, without cop-
ying, independently arrive at the precise combination of words or
notes which have been copyrighted.”281 Indeed, in a later case, Judge
Hand authored an opinion for the Second Circuit expressly repudi-
ating its prior holding in Hein as “contrary to the very foundation of
copyright law.”282 That foundation, copyright’s prevailing process-
based limitation on liability, has historically been more of a judicial
assumption than a statutory mandate.283
Not only did courts create the requirement of actual copying, but
they also created a “substantial similarity” framework intended to
detect which copying is permissible.284 The contours of that doctrine
find little foothold in the bare words “reproduce” or “copy,” yet
judges fashioned it anyway.285 Judge-made law thus already recog-
280 See Hein v. Harris, 183 F. 107, 108–09 (2d Cir. 1910).
281 Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Learned Hand, J.).
Curiously, Judge Hand was also the district court judge that the Second Circuit affirmed in
the directly contrary Hein case, though he never cited it in Fred Fisher. See Hein, 183 F. at
108.
282 Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 275 (2d Cir. 1936); see also
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 634 n.114 (2d ed. 2011)
(discussing Judge Hand’s pre-conference memo in Arnstein, which called Hein “just as
wrong as a decision can possibly be in copyright . . . an abysmally ignorant decision”
(quoting Pre-conference Memorandum from Learned Hand on Arnstein v. Edward B.
Marks Music Corp. (Oct. 20, 1935) (on file with the Harvard University Law School
Library in the Learned Hand Papers Collection, box 195 folder 22))). The Arnstein court
did try to connect the existence of an independent creation defense to the 1909 Act’s text,
but its reasoning assumes its own conclusion. The court determined that because the
statute framed the exclusive right around “the work,” that right could extend only to
“mak[ing] use of the corporeal object by means of which the author has expressed
himself,” and not to “creat[ing] other ‘works’ even though they are identical.” Arnstein, 82
F.2d at 275 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1970)). That reasoning only succeeds if one has
already defined “the work” as something unique to a particular author, a move that seems
to depend on—rather than prove—an independent creation doctrine.
283 See PATRY, supra note 277, § 9:100 n.1 (describing the independent creation defense
as an “assum[ption] by the courts from the beginning”).
284 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (formulating the now-
ubiquitous test under which, even if some copying occurred, a plaintiff must still prove that
it was “improper”).
285 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62
DUKE L.J. 203, 215 (2012) (noting that substantial similarity is an even more “common-
law-like” body of law than fair use because “[u]nlike fair use, which today finds mention in
the Copyright Act of 1976, substantial similarity continues to remain a doctrine that is
policed, enforced, and molded entirely by courts” (footnote omitted)); Shyamkrishna
Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Equity’s Unstated Domain: The Role of Equity in
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nizes that some acts of copying should fail even a prima facie case.286
If courts can cultivate a common law for determining which copies are
improper, they could also conceivably cultivate a common law for
determining which copy processes are improper.
Nevertheless, though the prima facie route might work on a theo-
retical level, it faces a steep climb on a practical level. The elements of
copyright infringement are by this point well entrenched. Those ele-
ments do not provide a doctrinal infrastructure for considering a
defendant’s copy process. While independent creation doctrine does a
good job looking for actual copying, it provides no tools for evaluating
the nature of any copying it finds. Courts would need to develop those
from scratch. And substantial similarity, a doctrine whose mechanics
has always focused on end products, would be an awkward vehicle for
promoting greater attention to process. Relying on courts to graft
copy process onto the plaintiff’s prima facie case without an amend-
ment to the Copyright Act is thus, as a practical matter, a long shot.
As a result, this Article suggests a more modest intervention that
relies on another judge-made copyright doctrine: fair use.287 Through
fair use, copyright law already measures the welfare effects of
allowing particular instances of copying. “[A] use that generates value
for the ‘broader public interest,’” as one recent case concluded,
“weighs in favor of fair use.”288 In determining this broader public
interest, courts favor various kinds of products, be they parodies,289
thumbnail images in search engine results,290 or incidental snippets of
Shaping Copyright Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1869 & n.52 (2015) (noting that
substantial similarity “find[s] no mention . . . in the text of the statute”).
286 See Balganesh, supra note 277, at 221 (describing substantial similarity’s “large
normative component in which courts are to judge the wrongfulness of a defendant’s act of
copying, once shown to exist”).
287 While fair use is today codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012), it began as a creation of the
courts. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
288 Assoc. Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 552 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[C]ourts are more
willing to find a secondary use fair when it produces a value that benefits the broader
public interest.”).
289 E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (noting that
parody “can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the
process, creating a new one”).
290 E.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (permitting
reproduction of thumbnails because they “do not supplant the need for the originals” and
simultaneously “benefit the public by enhancing information-gathering techniques on the
internet”).
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copied material.291 I propose that they favor various kinds of
processes as well.
This proposal would not mean that uses already deemed fair
under the law risk reverting to infringing status just because they’re
automated. Copy process could function like a one-way ratchet, a tool
that’s already familiar to courts from other multifactor analyses,292
either weighing in favor of fair use or in no direction at all.293 If a
product—say, Google Books—offers sufficient public benefit to merit
a fair use finding, the absence of a preferred process shouldn’t change
that outcome.294 That Google employees scan manuscripts, rather
than transcribing them by hand, shouldn’t push the whole enterprise
into liability; the product itself provides enough social value on its
own. In a case like that, process is at worst a neutral factor. But in a
different case, where the product doesn’t offer enough benefit, courts
should consider process benefits as well. The upshot is that, under a
process-sensitive regime, fewer acts would be branded infringement.
Adding copy process to the fair use inquiry would cover scenarios
that the current doctrine doesn’t already reach, whether de jure or de
291 E.g., Jackson v. Warner Bros., 993 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (excusing the
incidental use of lithographs in a motion picture); Italian Book Corp. v. Am. Broad. Cos.,
458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (excusing the incidental use of a song playing in the
background of a news segment).
292 See, e.g., Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care, LLC v. Minich ex rel. Shaffer, No. 14-4459,
2015 WL 6111426, at *4 (3d Cir. Oct. 16, 2015) (noting that, within the Colorado River
abstention factors, the adequacy of the state forum “is generally a one-way ratchet, serving
only to weigh against abstention where a state court is incapable of protecting a party’s
interests”); SEC v. Thompson, 732 F.3d 1151, 1168 (10th Cir. 2013) (observing that one of
the factors for determining whether a promissory note qualifies as a security is a “one-way
ratchet[ ] allowing notes that would not be deemed securities under a balancing of the
other three factors nonetheless to be treated as securities if the public has been led to
believe they are,” but not allowing notes which under “the other factors would be deemed
securities to escape the reach of regulatory laws” (quoting Stoiber v. SEC, 161 F.3d 745,
751 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); United States v. Tadio, 663 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011)
(discussing cases holding that Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides a “one-way ratchet” under which “a district court may apply non-assistance
factors to award a lesser sentence reduction than a defendant’s assistance alone warrants
or to award no reduction at all, but may not apply these factors in deciding whether to
order a greater reduction”).
293 Others have proposed unidirectional fair use factors in different contexts. See, e.g.,
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1124 (1990)
(“When the secondary use does substantially interfere with the market for the copyrighted
work . . . this factor powerfully opposes a finding of fair use. But the . . . fact that the
secondary use does not harm the market for the original gives no assurance that the
secondary use is justified.”); Eva E. Subotnik, Intent in Fair Use, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 935, 980 n.242 (2014) (“[A]n accused copyright infringer’s good-faith intent to
comply should serve as a one-way ratchet that favors fair use.”).
294 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that the
copying involved in the Google Books program was a fair use), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1658
(2016).
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facto. To be sure, there is some conceptual overlap with the existing
“transformative purpose” test, which favors second comers who use a
work “in a different manner or for a different purpose from the orig-
inal.”295 In theory, the copyist laboring in the museum gallery, for
instance, could invoke that doctrine to insulate her educationally
motivated work. Nevertheless, in practice, purpose hasn’t proved up
to the task. Copyright restrictions continue to limit the range of paint-
ings from which gallery copyists can work.296 Given the muddy nature
of fair use analysis, policymakers may be better off shielding welfare-
enhancing recreations behind multiple factors rather than banking on
purpose alone.297
Moreover, a strictly purpose-based test is both under- and over-
inclusive. It’s under-inclusive because sometimes it’s not primarily the
copyist’s purpose that drives the use’s social value. Take a recreator
who simply seeks attention for himself; the educational payoff is a
pleasant byproduct, not a bona fide purpose.298 In that case, process
goes where purpose cannot. Purpose is over-inclusive in that, even
when done for identical purposes, some processes are simply more
valuable than others. One can pay homage to an author by recreating
a work from scratch. Or one can pay homage to that author by distrib-
uting copies on BitTorrent with a “no copyright infringement
intended” disclaimer.299 Same purpose, different payoff. Tracking pro-
cess and purpose would thus yield fewer doctrinal misfires than would
trying to shoehorn the same policy goals into a test that has room only
for purpose and nothing more.
Importantly, courts don’t need any new legislative authority to
start counting copy process in the fair use analysis. This Article’s pro-
posal is ready to use right out of the box. The first statutory factor of
the fair use test already tells judges to consider the “character of the
use.”300 Courts have interpreted that provision capaciously, invoking
it to examine not only whether the defendant’s use was commercial
(which is specified in the statutory text) but also whether the use was
295 Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301, 309–10 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir. 2009)).
296 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
297 Cf. John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629
(2016) (examining how legal doctrine might be designed to benefit from redundancy while
mitigating anti-redundancy concerns).
298 Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) (concluding that
“the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes” if the alleged infringer
uses the original work “merely . . . to get attention”).
299 See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459,
1534.
300 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
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transformative (which isn’t).301 There is nothing about the text that
cabins it to the defendant’s product. Quite the opposite. The defen-
dant’s “use” is an action, not a result. It makes at least as much sense
for the word “use” to cover the defendant’s process as it does the
defendant’s product.302 Perhaps the only reason courts have yet to
interpret it this way is that they lacked a justification to do so.
Thus far, this Article has sought to provide that missing justifica-
tion. The remainder briefly sketches out how things might work in
practice. Though trade secret law is a helpful template for the exis-
tence of a policy lever that assesses the means of copying, on the finer
details of implementation copyright must part ways. As a general
matter, the trade-secret analogy breaks down in spots where permit-
ting recreation (or the subsequent exploitation of an existing recrea-
tion) would destroy the economic incentives that justify copyright’s
grant of an exclusive right to begin with. Those spots, as I’ve argued
above, are nowhere near as pervasive as conventional copyright
theory suggests, but they do exist. The following subsections examine
them.
A. Subject Matter Limitations
An improper means inquiry could take several forms. The defini-
tion of improper means could be made either a rule or a standard.
Separately, the absence of improper means could be a complete
defense or merely a thumb on the scale. Trade secrecy’s approach to
reverse engineering chooses the first option on each, establishing a
standalone rule: if you reverse engineer, you’re in the clear.303 It
doesn’t distinguish based on product or industry. So long as the model
301 See, e.g., Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 2013)
(dividing its first-factor analysis between whether the new work was transformative and
whether the defendant’s use of the owner’s work served a commercial purpose).
302 Cf. Heilman v. Bell, 583 F.2d 373, 375–76 (7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting an attempt to fit
mechanical duplication within the 1909 Act’s compulsory license governing cover songs
because, even though there was similarity “in the end product” there was still “no
similarity in the ‘use’ of the composition” as required by statute (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1(e)
(1970)).
303 Other forms of derivation are judged according to an open-ended reasonableness
standard. See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir.
1970) (“A complete catalogue of improper means is not possible. In general they are
means which fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and
reasonable conduct.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (AM. LAW
INST. 1939))).
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containing the information being reverse engineered was itself
acquired lawfully, the means are proper.304
Trade secret law can afford that open-tent approach on the back-
end infringement inquiry because it is selective on the front-end pro-
tectability inquiry. Only information that is “not . . . readily ascertain-
able by proper means” is eligible for trade secret protection to begin
with.305 As a result, there wouldn’t be any right to infringe unless the
act of reverse engineering was necessarily hard to do.
Copyright protection, by contrast, extends to works regardless of
how easy they are for another to recreate.306 All that’s needed is, in
the Supreme Court’s formulation, “independent creation plus a mod-
icum of creativity.”307 That means the ease, audience reception, and
learning benefits of recreation will all vary according to the medium
involved. Across such a wide range of subject matter, copy process
won’t always be a meaningful factor. An important question is
whether the act of recreation requires technical skill. Repainting a
painting, refilming a movie, or rerecording a musical composition fit
neatly within this Article’s framework. Copying out in longhand the
text of a poem is more complicated. On the one hand, it costs little
and probably doesn’t impress most audiences the way that an exact
recreation of visual or cinematic works do (try copying out this article
with a pen and paper and see how many people celebrate your
achievement).308 On the other hand, copying poetry by hand still has
potential pedagogical value.309 So the case for allowing handmade
copies of verbal texts may be weaker, but it’s not negligible. Courts
must stay attuned to the welfare effects of particular processes, just as
they do with particular products.
Trade secrets have another homogeneity that copyright subject
matter lacks. They all derive their economic value from being kept
304 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (“The
acquisition of the known product must, of course, also be by a fair and honest means, such
as purchase of the item on the open market for reverse engineering to be lawful . . . .”).
305 See id. § 1(4)(i).
306 See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ refusal to protect
“sweat of the brow”).
307 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
308 But see JORGE LUIS BORGES, Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote, in FICCIONES
29–38 (Anthony Bonner trans., Emece´ Editores S.A. 1993) (offering a fictional account of
a DON QUIXOTE recreator who tries to rewrite the book word for word not by copying the
text but by deriving inspiration from life experiences, including an initial attempt to “know
Spanish well, to re-embrace the Catholic faith, to fight against Moors and Turks, to forget
European history between 1602 and 1918, and to be Miguel Cervantes”).
309 Jack London, for example, reportedly acquired his chops by copying out great
literature in the San Francisco public library word for word, focusing on what made each
sentence tick. See SUSAN WISE BAUER & JESSIE WISE, THE WELL-TRAINED MIND: A
GUIDE TO CLASSICAL EDUCATION AT HOME 64 (3d ed. 2009).
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secret.310 So long as they remain generally unknown, they are valu-
able, even if a handful of third parties successfully reverse engineer
the information for their private benefit. Copyrightable works, on the
other hand, derive economic value in different ways, some of which
are more affected by recreations than others. Take, for instance, a
script for a play. Although there may be a small market for reproduc-
tions of the script itself, its primary value comes from the exclusive
right to perform it on stage. It may very well be that bringing the play
to life is difficult and time-intensive, educative for the performers, and
appreciated by audiences in a way that a filmed copy of another’s per-
formance isn’t—all facts that would weigh in favor of allowing a recre-
ation. And yet doing so would eviscerate the market for the original
script. Authors who depend on income from performances are more
vulnerable to unauthorized recreations, since recreations are, at
bottom, performances.311
Generally speaking, then, copy process should matter most in
industries that don’t rely heavily on licensing recreative performances.
This suggested rule is simply an extension of the well-established cop-
yright principle that a market harm for licensing revenues will only be
recognized for “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed mar-
kets.”312 The primary beneficiaries would likely be those working in
visual media—painting, graphic design, film, and the like. Some
musical compositions would also be affected but for the fact that they
are already subject to the compulsory “cover” license under § 115 of
the Copyright Act.313
B. Derivative Works
Another question is how to handle translations into new lan-
guages or new media. The Copyright Act grants owners the exclusive
right to prepare not only literal reproductions but also “derivative
310 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (limiting trade
secret protection to information that “derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known” and “not being readily ascertainable”).
311 See supra note 196 and accompanying text (noting how each piece of art is a
performance by an artist that audiences enjoy).
312 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614 (2d Cir. 2006)
(quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994)).
313 See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012); supra text accompanying notes 123–28 (discussing
compulsory licenses). Because composers in some genres tend to rely on other artists to
record their work (e.g., country songwriters and classical composers) while in other genres
they tend to record it themselves (e.g., singer/songwriters and rock bands), the economic
impact would not be uniform. Those composers whose business depends on licensing
others to record their work would, like the playwrights discussed in the preceding
paragraph, have a strong argument against permitting unauthorized recreations.
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works,”314 a category that expressly includes translations, dramatiza-
tions, and motion picture versions.315 Yet these works seem to carry
all the benefits of recreations as I have defined them here. Translating
well, whether from English to German or from novel to cinema, is
extremely difficult. It also cultivates great skill.316 Why then shouldn’t
it be allowed? Or, put differently, why don’t the exceptions that I’ve
advanced in this Article swallow the derivative work right whole?
Part of the answer may simply be that, even taking into account
recreations’ value, the benefits of allowing authors to control deriva-
tive works still outweigh the benefits of letting anyone make them.
The derivative work right can incentivize original creation,317 permit
authors to craft sequels and spinoffs without needing to rush them to
market,318 and push downstream users to make more creative use of
existing cultural materials.319 But each of those justifications is
strongest when applied to the markets that the creator of the original
work can reasonably expect to reach.320 To the extent that recreating a
work is beyond those reasonable expectations, there’s less reason to
314 Id. § 106(2).
315 See id. § 101. The definition also includes “art reproduction[s],” id., which might at
first suggest that Congress specifically foreclosed a use that I’ve offered here as a
paradigmatic recreation when done from scratch. That reading of the statute, however,
would be too broad. The word “reproduce,” which the statute does not define, is the
operative verb in the provision granting the owner the basic right to make copies. See id.
§ 106(1). There’s no good reason to read “art reproduction” as any more impervious to fair
use considerations than the reproductions of any other work. Thus, in analyzing fair use
arguments, the statute leaves courts as free to distinguish between the copy processes of
“art” as of any other kind of work.
316 Indeed, early case law allowed unlicensed translations because of the intellectual
labor involved. See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514)
(“To make a good translation of a work often requires more learning, talent and judgment,
than was required to write the original. Many can transfer from one language to another,
but few can translate.”). That rule lasted until 1870, when Congress amended the copyright
statute to give owners the ability to control translations. See Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230,
§ 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
317 See Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative
Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505, 1528–30 (2013) (describing certain classes of authors for
whom “derivative markets factor into decisions about whether to create new works and
what kinds of works to create”).
318 See id. at 1530–31.
319 See Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related
Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317 (2005) (arguing that without a derivative work right,
authors may invest in inefficiently similar adaptations); Joseph P. Fishman, Creating
Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2015) (arguing that the derivative work right
may generate creativity by constraining authors’ use of familiar expressive solutions).
320 See Samuelson, supra note 317, at 1521 (noting that a common denominator of
derivative works is that they are all “aimed at clearly foreseeable markets to the works on
which the derivatives are based”).
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label it infringement.321 Developing a novel into a movie, for example,
is well within the heartland of uses that many novelists anticipate.322
Recreating the same movie from scratch isn’t. There will also be cer-
tain transformations between media that are similarly remote, like a
three-dimensional restaging of a photographed scene.323 Though the
derivative work right covers widely foreseeable kinds of translation, it
shouldn’t include such distant activity.
Moreover, audiences’ process preferences are probably weaker
for the average derivative work than for the average close copy.
Recall that audiences often value recreations precisely because they
are the work of someone other than the original author.324 Seeing a
second comer skillfully replicate an author’s creation tends to be more
rewarding than seeing the author do the same thing twice. That’s not
necessarily the case with derivative works. An audience may value a
work recast in a new medium regardless of whether the original
author is the one doing the recasting. The justification for allowing
recreations is thus somewhat stronger for close copies.
C. Post-Copying Use
A third set of questions revolves around what the copyist may do
with a recreation once it’s made. In trade secret law, a successful
reverse engineer stands on the same footing as the original possessor
of the trade secret. She may use or disclose the information however
she wishes.325 In theory, that would allow a single second comer to
destroy a trade secret through public disclosure. In practice, however,
the law assumes that appropriators “will often have the same incen-
tive as the originator to maintain the confidentiality of the secret in
order to profit from the proprietary knowledge.”326 As a result, trade
321 See id. at 1559–60 (explaining how the more unforeseeable the market, the less
compelling the various rationales for the derivative work).
322 See id. at 1529 (“Novelists and playwrights frequently expect their works to be
transformed into movies or translated from one language to another. Screenwriters and
novelists often anticipate having their works adapted for the stage.”).
323 See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text.
325 See, e.g., Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (N.Y. 1889) (concluding that it is
permissible to reproduce a product through reverse engineering but not through bribing
someone for the necessary information); Bone, supra note 28, at 250 n.44 (“[T]hose who
learn the secret lawfully have trade secret rights of their own provided they too keep the
information secret—at least until the information is discovered by too many people.”).
326 Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2009); see
also Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 18, at 1658 (noting that trade secret cases seldom
need to address a reverse engineer’s attempt to publish the secret “because reverse
engineers have generally had little incentive to publish or otherwise disclose information
they learn from reverse engineering. Reverse engineers have typically kept the resulting
know-how secret for competitive advantage.”); Varadarajan, supra note 5, at 1436–37
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secret law can get away with granting lawful appropriators broad
leeway for post-appropriation use.
Copyright law can’t reasonably make the same assumption. Once
someone has laboriously recreated a work, there still often remains an
incentive to use it in ways that are harmful to the owner’s primary
market. If the law didn’t regulate that activity, a copyist could effec-
tively launder millions of cheap and even instantaneous duplications
through a single laborious recreation. A factory could churn out quick
copies based on a handmade “patient zero” copy. Unlike a transform-
ative fair use, a purely process-based fair use does not generate a new
work that its author is fully free to exploit. The recreator’s fair use
right shouldn’t guarantee a subsequent right to duplicate the work
endlessly.327 Rather, post-recreation use, like any use of another’s
copyrighted work, should be judged according to the standard fair use
factors. Those factors leave room for communicating a recreation to
others on a small scale, even if they don’t provide carte blanche for all
forms of commercial exploitation.328
Of course, noncommercial copying itself weighs in favor of fair
use, raising the question whether it—not copy process—should be
doing the real work in my recreation examples. There are, however,
two reasons why the commercial use factor doesn’t obviate considera-
tion of copy process. First, many fair use cases have interpreted the
commercial use concept broadly, extending it to personal uses from
which the user derives some nonmonetary benefit without paying the
customary market price.329 Downloading a free mp3 file for your pri-
(“[T]rade secret disputes often arise between competitors, and neither wants to destroy the
secret’s value by publishing it . . . .”).
327 One could plausibly imagine a different model based on the Section 115 compulsory
license, which specifies a minimum royalty rate for duplications of a musical work’s
recorded performance. Congress could legislate a similar licensing scheme for multiple
fields besides music, where a second comer puts in the work to recreate the original and in
return can rely on a statutorily mandated licensing scheme without needing to worry about
the owner holding out. The details of such an alternative, legislative solution would be
difficult to get right—even on the music side, where the system has been in place for over a
century, there exists profound disagreement over whether the compulsory license ought to
be scrapped or at least overhauled in any of several divergent directions. See U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE 105–14 (2015).
Consequently, the merits of any proposed compulsory licensing scheme are beyond the
scope of this Article.
328 See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397,
413 (2003) (observing that fair use permits modest modifications to existing works “even if
communicated to others, particularly if the use is noncommercial and poses no harm to the
market”). A firm that recreated the same work on an industrial scale may fail this test. For
an existing example of this business model that’s limited to public-domain works, see
Copyrights, 1ST ART GALLERY, http://www.1st-art-gallery.com/copyrights.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2016).
329 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
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vate consumption counts as commercial.330 By that rationale, it seems
reasonable to say that recreating a Picasso and then hanging it on the
wall for your private admiration should count, too. After all, the
copyist in either case avoids compensating the owner for the repro-
duction. Incorporating copy process into the analysis could uncouple
the recreator from the downloader. Second, even if some recreations
are indeed noncommercial uses, overlapping factors are still useful as
fail-safes, as discussed above.331
A final point is that attribution looms particularly large in this
sphere. Although copyright law does not require providing attribution
to one’s source, courts have occasionally held that doing so weighs in
favor of fair use.332 Usually, the concern is that a copyist won’t credit
the original author, and certainly that concern remains for recreators
just as much as for duplicators.333 But given the acute potential for
forgery, an even greater worry should be that recreators may attempt
to pass off their work as the original. To address that possibility, courts
could discount a fair use argument if the defendant hasn’t identified a
recreation as such.334
330 See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 890–91 (7th Cir. 2005); A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA,
857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (downloading free video games counts as
commercial).
331 See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
332 See, e.g., Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that by
“neglect[ing] to credit [a writer] for her authorship of [the work]” and “substituting his
name as author in place of hers,” the defendant “severely undermine[d] his right to claim
the equitable defense of fair use”); Williamson v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 00 Civ.
8240(AGS), 2001 WL 1262964, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2001) (holding that “attribution,
coupled with the transformative nature of the defendants’ use of the quoted passages,
favors a finding of fair use”); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 211
(D. Mass. 1986) (finding that the “‘character’ of the use” factor weighed in the defendant’s
favor because he “credited [the owner] with the copyright of the reproduced works and
informed readers of how they could buy them from him” (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 562)); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2579
(2009) (“The defendant’s willingness to attribute the contributions of the first author to the
subsequent work has also sometimes favored fair use in authorial fair use cases.”).
333 See, e.g., Joel Rose, New Paintings Reignite the Bob Dylan Copycat Debate, NPR,
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/18/141423977/new-paintings-reignite-the-bob-dylan-copycat-
debate (Oct. 18, 2011, 4:34 PM) (describing popular backlash against Bob Dylan when it
was revealed that his paintings were copied from historical photographs rather than from
nature, as he had claimed).
334 Cf. Gale, supra note 225 (interviewing a copyist artist who signs her name to the
back of each replica public-domain painting in order to head off any forgery concerns);
Malcom Jones, supra note 224 (distinguishing between simply copying a painting from
passing off that copy as the original).
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CONCLUSION
Because “[n]ot all copying . . . is copyright infringement,”335 copy-
right cases necessarily involve a normative judgment concerning
which copying should be regulated and which shouldn’t.336 In this
Article, I’ve argued that this judgment should be based on copying’s
processes, not just its products. Copyright’s fair use inquiry has grown
to encompass almost all of the five W’s. Courts ask what was copied
and what (if anything) was created with it. They ask who did the
copying. They ask why that copying was done. There have even been
repeated calls for courts to ask when during the copyright term the
copying was done.337 Asking how the copying is done, on the other
hand, remains conspicuously absent.
But how matters. It matters to the ones recreating existing works.
It matters to the ones whose works are being recreated. And it mat-
ters to the audiences experiencing those recreations. Indeed, beneath
copyright’s black-letter veneer, some judges may already be feeling
copy process’s influence as audience members themselves.
The conceptual move of recognizing copy process’s effect on each
of these groups is a simple but deeply significant one. As the easiest
way to copy keeps getting easier, copyright law has affected an
increasing range of activities across an increasing range of works.
There ought to be some mechanism for courts to recognize—just as
they are able to recognize in trade secret law—that some cases aren’t
about the easiest way. Some means of copying predictably lead to
better ends than others. The law should be able to tell the difference.
335 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
336 See Balganesh, supra note 285, at 206 (discussing the “large, underappreciated
normative dimension” to copyright doctrine’s conception of actionable copying).
337 See Hughes, supra note 264 (arguing that the fair use doctrine should consider how
much of the owner’s copyright term has elapsed); Liu, supra note 263 (same).
